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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I examine the informational externalities of going public decisions for industrial
and banking sector. The results show that industrial rivals have positive valuation effects only in
response to venture backed IPOs and no significant reaction in response to non-venture backed
IPOs. I also find evidence that the effect on rival firms is stronger if they operate in low
concentrated industries (i.e. high competition) and have low growth opportunities. The relative size
of IPO firm seems to play an important role in the direction and magnitude of industry rivals'
valuation effects. Negative information revealed in the form of downward price revisions adversely
affect rival firms’ valuation. Positive information is also conveyed at the IPO announcements in
banking industry. Bank rivals experience wealth gains if they are headquartered in the same state
and no valuation effects if they are headquartered in the same region as the announcing bank.
However, positive and significant reactions are noted in Mid-Atlantic and Southwest regions and
negative reaction in Midwest region. Overall, these findings confirm that IPOs convey valuable
information to the market and investors use this information to reassess the value of the rival firms.

vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The initial public offering of equity is probably the most important information event in
the life of a firm. A going public firm must provide a broad set of information about its prospects
and performance and, as a result, it receives information from investors during the book-building
phase.
Although the information content of initial public offering announcements cannot be
computed for IPO firms, theoretical models of going public decisions predict positive
informational externalities on potential issuers (privately held firms) within the same industry.
Subramanyam and Titman (1999) show that going public firms generate positive externalities by
increasing the size and informational efficiency of the stock market, creating a "spillover" effect
for other firms to go public. Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm (2002) demonstrate that
informational externalities of IPOs imply a learning process in a sequence of related IPOs. The
benefit of IPO externality is higher among early followers.
If initial public offering announcements reveal valuable information for potential issuers
related by a common valuation factor, it is likely that investors in similar publicly traded firms
use this information to reassess the value of their own firms' future prospects. Therefore, initial
public offering announcements are likely to have externality effects for rival firms (i.e., publicly
held firms within the same industry). I address this issue, i.e., externality effects of initial public
offerings on the rival firms, in this dissertation.
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An important motive for examining this issue stems from the fact that two opposing
theories on externalities predict conflicting results regarding the effect of an IPO on rival firms.
An IPO, on one hand, might signal a change in industry's outlook (i.e. future growth
opportunities) and therefore, bring about positive valuation effects for rival firms. On the other
hand, the decision to go public might cause a reassessment of the competitive situation within the
industry. Since the IPO firm raises equity funds that can be used to expand in the product market
and compete more efficiently, rival firms may lose some of their market share. Therefore, this
possibility predicts negative valuation effects for rival firms.
Only a limited amount of work exists regarding the impact of IPO announcements on
rival firms. Melvin and Valero-Tonone (2003) examine the impact of U.S. cross-listing shares
(ADRs) on home-market rival firms. Since foreign firms list their shares for the first time in U.S.
and typically the listing is accompanied by raising equity, they can be viewed as IPOs with
potential information effects transferred to home-rival firms. The results show that rivals are hurt
by the listing of other firms in their industry. The result suggests that listing on US exchanges
enhances the ability of a cross-border firm to take advantage of growth opportunities not
available in its home country.
Slovin, Sushka and Ferarro (1985) find that rivals react negatively to equity carve-out
(non-traditional IPO) announcements. They interpret this result as unfavorable information about
industry prospects conveyed by equity carve-outs to industry rivals. They further show
comparable effects on rivals by firms that undertake traditional IPOs (107 firms). However, they
do not examine the event specific characteristics and industry or firms' characteristics that might
explain the diverse rivals' reaction across industries.
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Akhigbe, Borde and Whyte (2003) examine whether an industry effect exists for initial
public offerings. Their results show that IPO announcements are firm specific events, with no
information transferred to industry counterparts. They interpret this result as offsetting
information and competitive effects. However, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting
the results reported by Akhigbe et al. First, they do not separate the impact of venture capital
backed from non-venture backed IPOs. Second, the authors pool all the IPOs in the sample
without considering the difference in information structure between industrial and non-industrial
firms. Finally, they do not control for confounding events pertaining to rival firms around IPO
announcements that could potentially contaminate the rivals' stock price reaction around these
announcements.
There are two reasons why this analysis should be partitioned on industrial firms and
non-industrial firms. First, Diamond (1984, 1991) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) show
that information structure of banking firms is different than that of industrial firms. Slovin,
Sushka and Polonchek (1992) test this theory for seasoned equity and find that a bank public
announcement generates external information effects on other banks to an extent not found in
industrial sector. A bank decision to go public might not be entirely a voluntary action as it is for
unregulated, industrial firms, but it reflects private information held by managers and regulators
about bank's capital and the value of its loan portfolio. Second, the regulatory environment for
utility and banking industries creates less diversity across firms. Kohers (1999) shows that intraindustry information transfer is more pronounced in homogeneous industries, because investors
have higher propensity to draw inferences from public corporate events.
There are two main contributions in this dissertation. First, by examining the impact of
venture backed IPOs versus non-venture backed IPOs on industry counterparts, this study
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distinguishes between the information content and intra-industry information transfer between
the two subgroups. Second, the separation between the industrial and banking firms that went
public is crucial due to the difference in information structure of banking firms and the potential
for higher externalities effects on other banks.
The results show that rivals in industrial sector experience positive and significant
abnormal returns in response to venture backed IPOs and no significant reaction in response to
non-venture backed IPOs. This is consistent with the hypothesis that venture-backed IPOs signal
positive industry prospects and the information revealed has industry-wide implications. Another
important result is that rivals with high market-to-book value experience positive and significant
valuation effects in response to venture backed IPOs and low market-to-book value rivals have
negative and significant valuation effects in response to non-venture backed IPOs. This implies
that high market-to-book rivals have the ability to incorporate future growth opportunities
available within an industry when this information is signaled at the filing date. On the other
hand, low market-to-book rivals that operate in low concentrated industries may have a
competitive disadvantage when a non-venture backed IPO firm enters, probably because the
newly public firm may be more technologically advanced than its rivals are.
Bank IPOs generate higher externalities than industrial IPOs. Regardless of bank rivals'
location (same state/region), they experience positive abnormal returns in response to an
announcing IPO in the same state/region. This is consistent with Kohers (1999) who shows that
the presence of regulation creates less diversity across banking firms and therefore, investors
have higher propensity to react in response to public bank announcements. Within regional bank
reaction, two regions experience a higher externality effect: the Mid-Atlantic region and the
Southwest region. I interpret this result as rival banks having a higher opportunity to expand by
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acquiring a newly publicly traded bank in their region. This is consistent with the inter-state
acquisition and consolidation activity after 1997 as a result of branching deregulation Act of
1994.
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II discusses relevant literature. Chapter III
examines IPO externalities on rivals of industrial firms, while Chapter IV studies the same for
banking firms. Chapter V provides summary and concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The last two decades have seen an active market for initial public offerings of equity
securities in the United States. In keeping with this renewed interest in IPOs, a substantial
amount of theoretical and empirical work has been undertaken in recent years on various issues
pertaining to the IPO decision. These issues include rationale for going public, IPO
underpricing, allocation of shares in an IPO and reasons for the long run post-issue
underperformance. Below, in light of my dissertation objectives, is the literature review, focusing
primarily on theoretical arguments that have been advanced in explaining the going public
decision

2. 1. Theories of going public
The going public decision and its consequences have become an interesting theoretical
issue in recent years. Ritter and Welch (2002) classify the theories of going public in two groups:
life-cycle theories and market timing theories.
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2.1.1. Life Cycle Theories
Zingales (1995) models the first theory of going public decision focusing on the role of
an initial public offer (IPO) in maximizing the proceeds the initial owner can obtain in selling the
company. He further argues that an IPO facilitates a potential takeover, being much easier for a
potential acquirer to target a company when it is public. Zingales argues that when management
gets private benefits from corporate control, the going public decision helps increase the
bargaining power of the initial owner relative to potential buyer, allowing to extract a higher
value from the buyer.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) develop a model of going public decision of a firm
focusing on three essential differences between public and private firms. First, public firms have
a more dispersed ownership, which implies that equity holders in public firms are much better
diversified than those in private firms. Second, raising capital in public market implies that a
large group of investors must be convinced about the quality of the firm's projects. In
equilibrium, the cost incurred by outside investors to become informed is borne by the going
public firm, in the form of underpricing (setting a lower offer price). Third, when a firm goes
public, its share price becomes public information. This implies that many unsophisticated
investors who free ride on the information they infer from observable stock price reduce the
magnitude of the cost of outsiders' evaluation about firm's projects. The primary prediction of
Chemmanur and Fulghieri's model is that going public decision depends on the stage of firm's
lifetime. In early stage, it is optimal to remain private since there is a high information cost;
however, if the firm grows large enough, going public becomes the optimal equilibrium.
Maximovic and Pichler (2001) study a setting in which the firm's IPO conveys valuable
information to competitors in the product market. The timing of the going public decision trades
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off this disincentive of going public with the potential advantages of expanding early in the
product market using the capital raised at the IPO. A public offering creates a secondary market
for the firm's securities, which reveals valuable information about the new technology to
potential rivals. Potential rivals condition their entry decision on this information, thus reducing
the excess or insufficient entry. In this setting, a pioneer firm in an emerging industry faces both
technological risk and new-entry risk when goes public. Therefore, the timing and the choice of
financing depend on the public perception that the industry is viable, probability that a superior
technology may appear, and potential rivals' cost of entry (i.e., cost of research and development
paid for existing/ new technology).
Maximovic and Pichler's model predicts both the timing of IPOs and the success of IPOs
in the short- and long run horizon. For example, early public financing is predicted in industries
perceived to be viable, in which there is a low probability of being displaced by more
technologically advanced rivals. In industries where the new entry risk is significantly high, the
herding of IPOs is predicted. This means that the first public offering in an industry will cause
other firms to go public around the same time. In contrast, if the technology risk is the most
significant one, then the industry may be able to support only a small number of IPOs. If they are
not the first, or second, they will have to wait until the uncertainty about the new technology is
resolved.
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2.1.2. Market Timing Theories
The information asymmetry model developed by Lucas and McDonald (1990) predicts
that firms postpone their equity issue if they are currently underpriced. Therefore, if the firms'
market values are too low, they will delay their IPOs until the market offers favorable pricing.
Consistent with this prediction, firms avoid going public when few other good-quality firms
issue equity (Choe, Masulis and Nanda, 1993).
Another theory argues that public markets provide valuable information to entrepreneurs.
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) study a setting in which outside investors may obtain
information, unavailable to firm insiders, which is useful in making investment decisions. When
two investors expend the same resources on information collection, they may receive correlated
but different signals. In this case, the public market generates better information than a private
financier. One important aspect of information acquisition is the role of serendipity, i.e. stock
market investors may receive valuable information (with some noise) by chance, without any
cost. The diverse serendipitous information can provide a useful signal that could not have been
obtained if the firm were privately financed. When the role of serendipitous information is
strong, this creates incentive for additional investors to become "active" ones, making it more
attractive for firms to go public ("spillover effect"). By going public, firms generate positive
externalities by increasing the size and informational efficiency of the stock market. The main
prediction of the information-based model of going public is that it generates higher benefits in
large, liquid markets. This implies positive externalities associated with going public decision,
moving the economy from an "inferior" equilibrium with few firms publicly traded to a
"superior" equilibrium in which many firms go public. The above prediction contrast with that of
Chemmanur and Fulghieri's (1999) model in which the main advantage of going public is that
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public financing is cheaper than private financing because public investors can diversify their
portfolios.
The latest theory of going public deals with information learning over a sequence of
IPOs. Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm (2002) model the frictions that pioneering firms face
when they access public market. Going public produces information that influences production
decisions of their potential rivals (Persons and Warther, 1997). The externality created by the
pioneering firm is beneficial to potential entrants, because they costlessly learn about the
outcome of the pioneer (underpricing level, offer withdrawal, price revisions). Conditional on the
pioneers' experience, followers decide whether to go public or not, leading to inefficiency
associated with underinvestment problem. In Benveniste et al. model, followers learn not only
about pioneers' outcome but also about the viability of their own investment decisions,
conditional on the pioneer's outcome. In a setting in which the pioneering firm decides to cancel
the offering because of a weak feedback received from outside investors during book-building
phase, the follower may sometimes attempt an IPO. Also, the reverse might happen, when the
pioneer's IPO is a success, the follower might decide to remain private. Thus, firms that go
public later are able to free ride on the costly information generated by those in the same
industries that have gone public ahead of them. To solve this inefficiency, Benveniste et al.
illustrate how an intermediary can enhance the social welfare by resolving the coordination
problem between pioneers and followers. When firms share a common valuation factor (i.e. they
are in the same industry), the underwriter can bundle the offerings, forcing the followers to share
the cost of the information externality produced by pioneer's IPO. The major prediction of this
model is that IPOs tend to be clustered over time and within industries. Consequently, the hot
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IPO markets occur if pioneering firms go public only when there is a potential for mitigating the
followers' incentive to free ride on the pioneers' costly information acquisition.
The information externalities of IPOs imply a learning process across a sequence of
related IPOs, which diminishes over a series of IPOs (i.e., early followers learn more from the
pioneer's experience but late followers learn less). This predicts a different pattern of
underpricing level for pioneer and its followers. If the offerings are not bundled together, the
pioneering firm will have a higher underpricing than that of followers. However, in hot markets,
underwriters spread the cost of information across IPOs and thus, the level of underpricing
would not be lower for later offerings.

2.2. Empirical evidence of going public decisions
An inherent problem of empirically testing the going public decision lies in determining
the sample. In order to select a truly representative sample, a researcher has to be able to identify
not only the firms that have gone public but also the firms that have chosen not to. The
complexity in identifying the second group of firms makes the task of examining the full
implications of going public decision difficult at best. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998)
overcome this problem by examining a set of Italian firms that include private firms opting not to
go public. One of the findings is a larger than normal turnover of the controlling group, which
points to the importance of IPO as a stage in the sale of company, as Zingales (1995) suggests.
This change in the structure of ownership could potentially explain the diversification motive in
going public decision but, empirically, Pagano et al. find that controlling shareholders divest
very little at the time of IPO and they even slightly increase their holdings in the subsequent
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years. This fact diminishes the role of portfolio diversification as a reason for going public as
advocated by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999).
Lerner (1994) tests the market timing theory of going public focusing on the
biotechnology industry. The industry market-to-book ratio has an important role in the decision
to go public rather than to use private financing. Lerner documents a pattern suggesting that
companies go public when industry valuations are the highest. This increase in comparable firms'
valuation may reflect improvements in growth opportunities. On the other hand, investor
sentiment could also play a role in increased valuation. Lowry (2002) shows that investor
sentiment and IPO volume are positively correlated. Thus, it is not very clear whether going
public decision is driven by high investment opportunities or investor sentiment or both.
The information externalities model (Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm, 2002) raised
interest to empirically capture some of its predictions. Benveniste, Busaba, Wilhelm and Yu
(2003) examine the consequences of clustering in the IPO market, as suggested by Benveniste et
al. (2002). The evidence shows that potential issuers (privately held companies) learn from
information about a common valuation factor that spills over from their contemporaries (firms
attempting IPOs). This information spillover effect is documented, as many IPO firms revise
their offer terms during the registration period and even decide to withdraw the offer if
information received is not encouraging. Benveniste et al. (2003) explain the clusters of IPOs
over time and within the same industry as an institutional response to information externalities.
Because information production is costly and becomes public during marketing effort, no firm
has the incentive to be a pioneer in an IPO wave. It will be advantageous to wait and go public
later when it can observe the outcome from the previous offers. To resolve this coordination
problem, the investment banks bundle IPOs related by a common valuation factor. As a result,
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there are two effects: a uniform sharing of information production among firms that attempt an
IPO and a negative relation between underpricing and subsequent IPO volume among firms
subject to a common valuation factor. Information spillover and bundling effects are stronger at
the beginning of a sequence of IPOs than later in the IPO wave. Therefore, pioneers experience
larger proceeds revisions and higher initial returns compared to followers. Also, depending on
the followers' position in the IPO wave, the results show a higher probability of withdrawal and
higher initial returns for early followers relative to those of late followers. This result is
consistent with Benveniste et al. (2002) in the sense that IPO firms learn from the experience of
their contemporaries as well as from their own marketing effort, incorporating all this
information in the offering terms proposed in the preliminary prospectus.
The negative relation between initial returns and subsequent IPO volume is a direct
consequence of bundling IPO firms subject to a common valuation factor. When total cost of
information production is spread across a larger bundle of firms, the initial returns are lower.
This finding contrasts with that of Lowry and Schwert (2002), in which they document a positive
relationship between IPO volume and initial returns. To correctly interpret these contrasting
results, one needs to distinguish between the "hot market" relationship and bundling argument.
Bundling leads to lower initial returns, the more offerings subject to a common valuation factor
an IPO wave consists of. In a hot market, more positive information in the form of higher
expected valuations result in a higher initial returns and more companies filing to go public
(Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1988, 1994).
Lowry and Schwert (2002) find that the level of initial returns at the time companies file
to go public contains no information about their eventual underpricing. Thus, there is no
relationship between a company's underpricing and the average level of underpricing known at
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the time of filing. This implies that IPO firms do not incorporate the public information available
at the time they file a registration with SEC, and thus, they can't influence their underpricing by
timing the IPO. The only information that drives the positive relationship between initial returns
and IPO volume is the private information revealed during the registration period. The more
positive information (upward price revisions), the higher the initial returns and more companies
have incentives to go public soon after.
The cycles in initial returns and subsequent IPO volume represent a puzzle for
researchers. The main question is why companies file their offerings when average initial returns
are high? They could raise more money if they postpone the offerings till the initial returns
observed are low. Lowry (2002) shows that fluctuations in IPO volume are related to changes in
private firm's demand for capital, changes in adverse selection costs of raising equity and
variation in investor optimism. On average, firms tend to go public when private firm's demand
for capital is high, adverse selection cost of equity is low and investors are overoptimistic.
Loughran and Ritter (2002) use prospect theory to explain the cycles in initial returns. They
argue that initial returns are related to public information revealed during registration period, but
only partially incorporated in the offer price. The offerings, whose registration periods coincide
with periods of high market returns, tend to be underpriced. Because the registration periods of
IPO firms that choose to go public in about the same time overlap, this generates cycles in initial
returns.
The positive relationship between initial returns and IPO volume suggests that positive
information received during registration period drives companies to go public at higher
valuations than they had expected. This is consistent with prior empirical results in Pagano et al.
(1998) and Lowry (2002) in which companies tend to go public when industry market to book
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value is especially high. Assuming that the positive information revealed during the book
building phase results in high initial returns and affects other similar publicly traded firms, the
average market to book value of rivals should increase. Thus, it is possible that the IPO's
registration period may potentially have positive externalities not only on initial returns but also
on market valuation of rival firms.

2.3. Intra-industry Information Transfer of Corporate Event Announcements
King (1966) who examines the importance of industry factors in explaining stock returns
provides the foundation of intra-industry information transfer research. King finds that in
addition to market factors, industry commonality factors explain 10% of the variance of stock
returns.
The research of intra-industry information transfer contends that information disclosed by
one industry member has valuation effects for its industry counterparts (rivals). The direction of
rivals' stock price reactions depends on whether the information released by the announcing firm
reflects industry-wide commonalities (contagion effect), shifts in competition within the same
industry (competition effect) or firm-specific information (no valuation effect for rivals).
Volumes of research exist regarding announcement effects of various corporate events.
Valuation effects resulting from earnings and management earnings forecast announcements for
both the announcing firms and their rivals dominate the 1980’s intra-industry information
transfer studies. In 1990s, the information transfer literature has focused on other corporate
events, including going private transactions (Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck, 1991), stock
repurchases (Hertzel, 1991), seasoned equity/debt offerings (Szewczyk, 1992), dividend changes,
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dividend omissions/initiations (Laux, Starks and Yoon, 1998; Kohers, 1999), and stock splits
(Tawatnunchai and D'Mello, 2002).
In this section, I present the research in intra-industry information transfer classified in three
groups: contagion effect, competitive effect and firm specific information.

2.3.1. Contagion effect:
Using earnings as the information release, Foster (1981) identifies two sources of
information transfer effects: industry-wide commonalties type and competitive shift type. He
argues: "one possible source of an information transfer arises due to the earnings releases of firm
j conveying information about the impact of industry-wide commonalties on firm i or, about the
impact of competitive shifts within the industry for firm i". Foster finds evidence of intraindustry information transfer of actual earnings releases from announcing firms to nonannouncing firms within the same four-digit SIC code. The direction and magnitude of the
earnings releases effect on the announcing firms are determinants of the direction and magnitude
of announcement effect on other firms in the industry.
Clinch and Sinclair (1987) re-examine information transfer effects of earnings
announcements using a recursive system of equations approach that controls for
contemporaneous cross correlation of returns. For a sample of Australian firms, they find
evidence consistent with contagion effect of earnings announcements, but the magnitude of price
change diminishes for subsequent announcing firms in the same industry. Thus, the timing
pattern of earnings releases rejected by Foster (1981) is due to low-power non-parametric test
used.
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Han, Wild and Ramesh (1989) extend the intra-industry information research by
examining the management earnings forecast announcements. Using single- and two-index
(market and industry) models to distinguish between market- and industry- commonalties effects,
they find positive abnormal returns for both management forecast and non-management forecast
firms at the time of the announcements. Further, they show that the non-forecast firms' abnormal
returns are unrelated both in magnitude and direction to the forecast firms' abnormal return.
Therefore, the intra-industry information transfer associated with manager's forecast is
information that reflects industry-wide commonalties and not competitive advantages within
industry. Han and Wild (1990) re-examine the intra-industry information transfer, using the
unexpected earnings to proxy for the information signal. They find that intra-industry
information transfer is not due to covariation in firms' returns only, but also to competitive shifts.
Their conclusion contrasts with that advanced in their previous paper in which they find only
industry effects, but the dominant effect is the contagion one.
Other corporate events than earnings releases and management-forecast announcements
document contagion effect for non-announcing firms. For example, Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck
(1991) analyze going private transactions and find that bids to take firms private generate
positive abnormal returns for both target firms and their rivals. The sources of rivals' contagion
effect could be: private information about expected future cash flow in the industry, a higher
probability of subsequent buyout bids for target's rival firms or a potential industry-wide agency
problem that may induce managers to improve performance to avoid an outside bid. The
magnitude of rivals' reaction is a function of rival size relative to size of the target and buyout
specialist participation. The effect on share prices of industry rivals is inversely related to the
relative capitalized values of rival firms and target firms and positively related to the presence of
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buyout specialist. Slovin et al. point out that going private transactions generate positive external
information effects for industry rivals, suggesting that shareholders of rival firms gain from
costly acquisition of information associated with buyout transactions.
Szewczyk (1992) examines the information effects around corporate securities issues:
common stock, convertible securities and straight debt. He hypothesizes that corporate securities
offerings generate unfavorable information about the general prospects within an industry. The
evidence shows that rivals' reaction is positively correlated with announcing firms' negative
abnormal return. This result suggests that investors reassess the value of equity in the industry
(contagion effect) rather than it reflects competitive shifts between announcing firms and their
industry rivals.
Contrary to Szewczyk (1992), Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1992) find no information
effects of seasoned equity issues by industrial firms on their industry rivals. In a comparative
study, they examine the information externalities of bank seasoned equity issues versus industrial
firms seasoned equity issues. They show that information structure of banks, along with bank
regulation process, induces investors to interpret bank seasoned equity announcements as
negative signals of value for other banks. This finding supports the theoretical models of
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Gorton (1985) in which asymmetric information impounded in
bank asset portfolios leads to information externalities in banking industry. Slovin et al. explain
this result arguing that a bank decision to issue seasoned equity might not reflect entirely the
voluntary action as in the case of industrial firms; it might reflect the private information of
managers and regulators about bank's capital and the value of its loan portfolio. Pressures from
regulators to increase the bank capital and confidentiality of loan portfolio quality create external
valuation effects for other banks around seasoned equity issues announcements.
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The intra-industry information transfer of bankruptcy announcements have raised interest
in the literature, due to the two opposing effects these events may have on their rivals' equity
value. Lang and Stulz (1992) suggest that intra-industry effects are the sum of contagion and
competitive effect. The contagion effect is the change in the value of competitors that cannot be
attributed to wealth redistribution from the bankrupt firm. Thus, the bankruptcy announcement,
in addition to conveying negative information, can decrease the equity value of competitors
whose cash flows' characteristics are similar to those of the bankrupt firm. On the other hand, the
competitive effect is the wealth gain experienced by the industry rivals, since bankruptcy
announcement conveys information about the demand shift. Thus, depending on the level of
market concentration, the industry rivals may experience an increase in demand. Also, the rivals'
leverage ratio plays an important role in intra-industry information transfer around bankruptcy
announcements. Leverage magnifies the contagion effect but not the competitive effect. The
results show that high-leveraged rival portfolios experience negative and significant abnormal
returns as a response to a bankruptcy announcement, whereas low leveraged rival portfolios have
positive but insignificant reaction. Overall, the contagion effect dominates; for the whole sample,
rivals lose about 1 percent in equity value. The analysis for the sub-samples demonstrates that in
industries with low leverage and low degree of competition, rivals react positively, whereas in
industries with high leverage and high degree of competition, competitors lose about 3.2 percent
in their equity value.
Firth (1996) finds evidence consistent with intra-industry information transfer around
dividend changes announcements. A prior study (Boim, 1977) documents spillover effects in
response to Consolidated Edison's decision to pay no dividend in 1974; however, this study is
limited to a single event and therefore difficult to generalize. Firth links dividend signaling and
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information transfer to test whether dividend change (at least 10 percent relative to stock price)
of one firm is associated with change in valuation of other firms within the same industry. He
finds small, but significant contagion effects of dividend changes on industry rivals. Information
transfer associated with dividend surprises affects earnings forecast of both announcing and nonannouncing firms, and this leads to stock price revisions. The magnitude of industry rivals
reaction depends upon the degree of dividend surprise, recent dividend history of other nonannouncing firms and level of homogeneity within industry (proxied by stock returns correlation
between announcing and non-announcing firms). Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) analyze large
dividend revisions (at least 25%) to study the intra-industry valuation effects on non-announcing
firms. On average, dividend increases/decreases lead to positive/negative abnormal returns for
rival portfolios. However, breaking down the sample in rivals whose Tobin's q is higher (lower)
than that of the announcing firm and subsequently divide these samples in those whose
Herfindhal Index is greater (lower) than that of the announcing firm, leads to contrasting results.
The authors find that dividend revision events lead to two offsetting price effects; for rivals
without extensive market power or growth options relative to the announcer, dividend increases
elicit no reaction and dividend decreases elicit a negative reaction. Rivals with extensive market
power experience positive reaction to dividend increases and no reaction to dividend decreases.
In addition, Laux et al. find evidence that industry rivals experience changes in dividend yield
subsequent to the announcement; this shows that a shift in industry prospects leads to a shift in
rivals' ability to pay dividend.
Although the evidence of information transfer related to regular dividend announcement
it appears to be clear, the dividend initiation/omission announcements in intra-industry
information setting is not conclusive (Howe and Shen, 1998; Impson, 2000). However, Otchere
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(2000) documents a contagion effect associated with dividend initiation announcements for a
sample of Australian firms. While he finds that there is some evidence of competitive
realignment in the industry, the information effects are positive on average for industry rivals
(consistent with contagion effect).
Eckbo (1983) estimates the valuation effects to horizontal competitors of target firms
around merger proposals to assess whether the rival firms gain from collusion. Under the
collusion hypothesis, rival firms benefit from the merger since successful collusion limits output
and raises product prices. If rivals remain outside the collusive agreement, the positive reaction
still holds since these firms free ride on the higher product price. The collusion argument doesn't
necessarily mean that a given merger is indeed anticompetitive. Even though the positive
reaction of rival firms is consistent with collusion argument, it can be also consistent with
productive efficiency hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, there are two possible offsetting effects:
price effect and information effect. The net reaction is the sum of these offsetting effects. First,
the intensified competition in product and factor markets results in lower prices for both products
and factors. This effect leads to a negative change in the market value of rivals around merger
proposal announcements. Second, the news of an efficient merger proposal can signal investment
opportunities for the rivals and this leads to increase in rivals' market value around merger
proposal announcements.
Overall, Eckbo's findings reveal no significant evidence that the competitors of the
merging firms lose value at the time of proposed horizontal mergers. He finds a positive
abnormal return for rivals of horizontal mergers, which is consistent with productive efficiency
hypothesis (information effect offsets price effect) but also with collusion hypothesis. To shed
more light on the true effect that drives the rivals' wealth change around horizontal merger

22

proposals, Eckbo (1985) examines the role of market concentration (pre- and post- merger) to
assess whether a horizontal merger has collusive, anticompetitive effects. The market
concentration doctrine predicts that the greater the merger-induced change in industry
concentration, the more likely collusive effects a horizontal merger has. It follows that the
expected gain for rivals of merging firms is increasing with the concentration change. Eckbo
finds evidence that rejects the market concentration doctrine, mainly due to negative relation
between the industry wealth effects and merger-induced change in concentration. He argues that
the positive industry wealth effects reflect good news concerning opportunities for productivity
increases that are available to rival firms in the same industry.
Like Eckbo (1983), Akhigbe and Madura (1999) analyze the market reaction of rival
banks in response to bank acquisition announcement. Examining a single industry allows
focusing on how event-specific and bank-specific factors affects the intra-industry effects;
specifically, Akhigbe and Madura focus on the distribution of valuation effects across bank
acquisition announcements and across rival banks within each announcement. The results show a
contagion effect (both target banks and their rivals react positively to acquisition
announcements). This effect could be explained as bank acquisitions signal valuable information
about the probability that rival banks are subsequently acquired or, good prospects for banking
industry. The cumulative abnormal return of rivals conditioned on event-specific characteristics
are positively related to target bank abnormal return and negatively related to the prior
performance of rival banks. Also, the size of target bank and the probability of an individual rival
being acquired explain valuation effects of bank acquisitions. The results parallel those of Eckbo
(1983) and in addition, show that the valuation of rival banks is influenced not only by
characteristics of the event but by their own specific characteristics as well.
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The contagion effect is documented also in association with loan loss reserve (LLR)
announcements. The information effects of bank LLR decisions have the potential to show
whether banks process and signal asymmetric information about credit conditions. Two studies
examine the impact of Citicorp's LLR announcement on other money center banks (Musumeci
and Sinkey, 1990b; Grammatikos and Saunders, 1990). The former documents significant
contagion effect of money center banks in response to Citicorp's decision to increase its reserve
allocation. Both Citicorp and its rivals (money center banks) experience positive abnormal
returns at the time of the announcement, which can be interpreted as a signal of value-enhancing
corporate restructuring. The latter, however, documents no reaction for rivals. Grammatikos and
Saunders contend that LLR additions that followed Citicorp's May 1987 LLR announcement
contain no new or unexpected LLR information and therefore, there is no intra-industry
information effect. Both studies focus on information transfer associated with a single event.
Thus, it offers a narrow insight into the contagion effects of money-center banks following LLR
announcements.
To shed more light on the existing evidence, Docking, Hirschey and Jones (1997)
examine a large sample of LLR announcements to assess whether the market interprets LLR
announcements by money center banks differently from those made by regional banks. In
addition, they analyze the importance of contagion effects associated with regional bank LLR
announcements by considering region-by-region differences in rivals' reaction. The evidence
shows significant negative contagion effects for non-announcing money center banks and
regional banks following LLR announcements by regional banks. These negative effects are
more prominent in New England, Mid-Atlantic and Southwest regions. Surprisingly, there is no
conclusive evidence of negative contagion effects following LLR announcements by money
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center banks. This parallel Grammatikos and Saunders' finding in which money center bank LLR
announcements generate no externalities to either non-announcing money center banks or
regional banks. One possible explanation for the lack of contagion effect is the intense analyst
coverage and continuos flow of information of money center banks. The negative contagion
effects of LLR announcements by regional banks might be explained by market's relative lack of
information with respect to the quality of regional bank loan portfolios. That may be why
regional bank LLR announcements contain more information than those made by money center
banks.

2.3.2 Competition effect:
Saunders and Smirlock (1987) examine the intra-industry information transfer in
response to a single event: BankAmerica's entry into discount brokerage business. Despite the
absence of a regulatory approval, BankAmerica Corporation announced its intention to acquire
Charles Schwab and Company (November 1981) and it became the first commercial banking
firm to offer discount brokerage services to its customers. This event had two opposite
implications for rival firms: 1) a contagion effect as rival commercial banks would enter the
brokerage business, or 2) a competitive effect faced by securities firms resulting from potential
loss in market share. The evidence shows that securities firms experience a significant decline in
the market value at the time of BankAmerica's announcement. This suggests that securities firms'
reluctance to bank entry into discount brokerage was self-motivated. The negative reaction of
securities firms in response to this event reflects a significant shift in competition within
securities industry, whereas rivals in banking industry (both money center banks and regional

25

banks) experience no reaction as a result of BankAmerica's intention to acquire a leading
discount brokerage firm.
Besley and Kohers (2000) analyze the intra-industry valuation effects associated with
private placements of common equity and find negative reaction for rival firms as opposed to
positive reaction for issuing firms. The results of this study provide new evidence on the
competitive implications of private issues and the strength of the information content associated
with private placements. Private financing helps firms to protect valuable information from being
disclosed publicly (i.e. potentially profitable projects, new technological developments); thus,
information that might be valuable for rival firms, remains private. There are two explanations as
to why rival firms react negatively to private placement issues. First, if managers choose private
equity placements to prevent disclosure of private information, it is possible that private equity
placement might be considered “bad news” for rival firms. This would support theoretical
models of Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) and Yosha (1995) in which privately placing equity is
expected to signal competitive shifts within the industry. On the other hand, if a private equity
placement is considered a substitute for a public equity placement, the results would parallel
those of Szewczyk (1992), who find that industry rivals experience negative stock reactions. The
evidence shows that private placements of equity reflect shifts in competition within the same
industry (competition effect) rather than industry-wide commonalties (contagion effect).

2.3.3 Firm-specific effect
Share repurchase is a corporate event that does not appear to contain information for
rivals. The information conveyed by repurchase announcements could be relevant for industry
rivals for two reasons. First, the information may reflect competitive shifts in industry (i.e., the
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repurchasing firm is a more efficient competitor) and second, it may reflect the industry
prospects as a whole (i.e., an increase in demand for industry product). These competing
possibilities might lead to offsetting effects, potentially neutralizing the valuation impact of
repurchase announcements on rival firms. This might be one explanation for why Hertzel (1991)
finds no reaction of industry rivals around share repurchase announcements. Hertzel, however,
argues that share repurchase is a firm-specific event (i.e., tax effects, wealth transfer between
security holders of repurchasing firm) and as such should not have valuation consequences for
rival firms. Hertzel’s results support share repurchases being a firm specific rather than
contagion or competitive type events.
Akhigbe, Borde and Whyte (2003) present clear evidence that there is no industry effect
for initial public offerings. Without separating regulated from unregulated sector, the information
associated with initial public offerings is not transferred to industry rivals. The authors interpret
this result as offsetting information and contagion effects. For subsamples, however, they
document positive and significant information effects associated with IPOs in regulated
industries and the first IPO in the industry. Significant negative competitive effects are
associated with relatively large IPOs in highly competitive industries, those in risky industries
and those in technology sector.
Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1992) examine the information externalities of seasoned
equity offerings by industrial firms and banks. Because banks and industrial firms have different
information structure, they hypothesize significant differences in the intra-industry effects of
adverse managerial signals by banks versus industrial firms. Contrary to Szewczyk (1992),
Slovin et al. find that while seasoned equity announcements by banks yield valuation
consequences for rivals, the same result does not hold for industrial firms. This suggests that
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industrial firms' equity issues convey only firm-specific information, whereas banks' equity
issues have information externalities for rival banks.
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CHAPTER III
INFORMATIONAL EXTERNALITIES OF GOING PUBLIC DECISIONS:
EVIDENCE FROM INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

3.1. Introduction
Prior studies document positive informational externality effects of IPOs on potential
issuers related by a common valuation factor (Subramanyam and Titman, 1999; Benveniste,
Busaba and Wilhelm, 2002). The information revealed at the time firms file their prospectus with
the SEC as well as the additional information revealed during bookbuilding phase, has a
significant impact on potential issuers that operate in the same industry. Potential issuers
condition their decision to become publicly traded companies depending upon the outcome of
their contemporaries (the probability of withdrawal, price revisions, underpricing). Benveniste,
Busaba, Wilhelm and Yu (2003) show that firms attempt to go public when positive information
spills over from previous IPOs (i.e. lower underpricing).
If initial public offering announcements reveal valuable information for potential issuers
related by a common valuation factor, it is likely that investors in similar publicly traded firms
use this information to reassess the value of their own firms' future prospects. Therefore, initial
public offering announcements are likely to have externality effects for rival firms within the
same industry.
In this study I expand the current research by examining the informational externalities of
going public decisions by industrial firms on existing publicly traded firms within the same
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industry (rivals). As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the information structure of industrial firms is
different from that of banking firms (Diamond, 1984, 1991 and Ramakrishnan and Thakor,
1984); therefore, the impact of IPO announcements on rival firms should be partitioned on
industrial firms and non-industrial firms.
The motivation to consider the informational externalities of going public decisions is
twofold: first, when a firm goes public it signals a change in industry's outlook as a whole (i.e.
future growth opportunities). Not only is there a substantial change in the size of the IPO firm
but also a change in investment opportunities available in a specific industry. Second, the
entrance of a new player, with more funds available to invest in growth opportunities, can
change the competitive situation within an industry. Lang and Stulz (1992) analyze the rivals'
reaction to bankruptcy announcements and show that a competitor's exit from a highly
concentrated industry makes rivals better off. In case of an IPO, rivals could be worried about
being displaced by a more competitive rival; hence an IPO announcement could potentially make
rivals worse off.
In this study, the major hypothesis is that going public firms generate significant
informational externalities on rival firms in the same industry around IPO announcements. On
average, the results show that there is a positive valuation effect for rivals which seems to
indicate that going public decisions signal positive industry prospects (i.e. future growth
opportunities). However, when the sample is partitioned into venture backed IPOs and nonventure backed IPOs, rivals have positive valuation effects only in response to venture backed
IPOs and no significant reaction in response to non-venture backed IPOs. I also find evidence
that the effect on rival firms is stronger if they operate in less concentrated industries (i.e. many
competitors) and have low growth opportunities. The relative size of the IPO firm seems to play
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an important role in the direction and magnitude of industry rivals' valuation effects.
Surprisingly, rivals experience larger wealth gains in response to a relatively larger entrant
within the same industry. Negative information revealed at the offering date in the form of
downward price revisions has a negative impact on rivals' valuation. In spite of a downward
price revision, an IPO firm may not withdraw the offer probably because it wants to expand early
in the product market, posing a threat to rival firms.

3.2. Hypotheses
3.2.1. Intra-industry information transfer around IPO announcements
Previous literature has shown that various firm-level announcements have implications
for rival firms. If the information disclosed has industry-wide implications, then rival firms
experience contagion effects (the direction of rivals' abnormal returns is the same as that of the
announcing firm). If the information revealed has competitive implications, rival firms' abnormal
returns have opposite direction than that of the announcing firms. Finally, information pertaining
to some corporate events is firm specific; therefore, there is no spillover or competitive effect on
rival firms.
If the information disclosed by IPO firms at the time they file with SEC has externality
effects as suggested by theoretical studies, then investors in similar companies use this
information to evaluate the value of their own firms' future prospects. Therefore, IPO
announcements are likely to affect stock prices of rival firms, thus having an industry-wide
implication. To test whether information conveyed by IPO announcements has an impact on the
equity value of rivals, I hypothesize that:
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H1:

An IPO announcement has a significant valuation impact on rival firms.

The rivals' reaction to IPO announcements can be either positive or negative depending
on how investors use the information revealed to make inferences about non-announcing firms'
future prospects. However, the positive and negative reactions are not mutually exclusive. Thus,
the rivals' reaction to IPO announcements is the sum of these two opposing effects. Either a
significant positive or a negative net effect indicates that IPO announcements reveal information
that has industry-wide implications.

3.2.1.1. The positive reaction prediction
According to market timing hypothesis, firms have the propensity to go public when
industry market-to-book ratios are especially high (Lerner, 1994). Also, Lowry (2002) shows
that high IPO volume occurs when private's firm demand for capital is high, adverse selection
cost of equity is low and investors are overoptimistic. If going public decision signals positive
industry prospects (i.e., future growth opportunities), the average market to book value of the
already publicly held firms should increase. Thus, it is possible that going public decisions may
potentially have positive externalities on market valuation of similar public firms.

3.2.1.2. The negative reaction prediction
Macsimovic and Pichler (2001) explore a setting in which the going public decision
conveys valuable information to competitors in the product market. By raising capital in the IPO
to expand a new technology, firms may convey strategic comparative advantages within
industry, and therefore, competitors face the probability of being displaced by a more
technologically advanced rival. This implies that rival firms should react negatively at the time
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of the IPO announcements. An even clearer negative reaction prediction stems from the signaling
product quality at the time of IPO (Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner, 2001). By offering to sell
stock in their firm, entrepreneurs are stating that they believe the firm has high quality products.
When an IPO is announced and a prospectus is released, sensitive information regarding the firm
and its industry is published. As the stock price rises, favorable publicity surrounding the firm
improves consumers’ perception of the quality of the firm’s products. As consumers increase
their product purchases, the stock price responds favorably, increasing the profits of the firm.
The stock prices of competitors can fall when a new IPO is announced if new information
conveys more positive prospects for the issuing firm than for the growth of the industry.

3.2.2. Venture backed IPOs vs. non venture backed IPOs
Venture capital firms specialize in collecting and evaluating information of start-up and
growth companies, which are more likely to be prone to information asymmetries and capital
constraints. Because venture capitalists firms have access to top tier investment bankers
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991), venture capital firms may partially overcome the information
asymmetry associated with start-up and growth companies and thus, a venture capital backed
firm will be less dependent on its internally generated funds. Also, venture capitalists are
successful in timing the decision to take the companies public (Lerner, 1994). A venture-backed
company goes public when its valuation is at the absolute, short-run peak and when the industry
valuations are highest. By successfully timing the IPO, venture capitalists derive significant
benefits, even though they rarely sell shares at the time of the offering. Taking companies when
equity values are high minimizes the dilution of the venture investor's ownership stake. Brav and
Gompers (1997) show that, venture backed IPO firms perform better than non-venture backed
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IPO firms, and the market incorporates these expectations at the time of going public. Therefore,
a venture backed IPO signals superior information to the market than a non-venture backed IPO.
Ivanov (2004) shows that venture backed IPOs have significant higher underpricing than nonventure backed IPOs and the valuations do not change much in the long run (five years after
IPO). Consistent with Brav and Gomper's (1997) findings, venture backed IPOs perform better in
the long run the non-venture backed IPOs. Also, a significant portion of venture capitalists
consists of corporate venture capitalists that have valuable industry expertise. When they bring
companies public, the certification role played by venture capitalist may explain why investors
are willing to pay more for venture backed IPOs. However, this higher undepricing represent a
real cost for venture capitalists, since they rarely sell shares in the IPO. Lee and Wahal (2003)
show that the difference in underpricing between venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs
(6.2%-9.5%) represent a wealth transfer from venture capitalists to new shareholders. As a
compensating benefit associated with incremental undepricing of venture backed IPOs, they
document a positive relationship between the level of undepricing and future inflows of capital to
venture capital firms. Thus, the "grandstanding" behavior documented by Gompers (1996)
explains the costs that venture capitalists are willing to bear in taking their portfolio companies
public. Overall, the recent empirical findings suggest that venture backed IPOs signal superior
information to the market relative to non-venture backed IPOs.
One important prediction derived from signaling and timing ability of venture capital
firms at the time they go public is that industry rivals will react differently to IPO
announcements, depending on whether the IPO is venture backed or not. Therefore, I
hypothesize that:

34

H2:

A venture backed IPO, compared to a non-venture backed IPO has higher
valuation effect on rival firms.

3.2.3. Relative size of IPO firm
The bigger the size of the IPO firm relative to the industry, the more information an IPO
is expected to convey. The larger the relative size of IPO firm, the greater the impact on industry
rivals' reactions. To examine whether the relative size of IPO firm has a differential impact on
stock price responses of industry rivals, I compute the relative size of IPO as the ratio of IPO
firm's total assets to industry rivals' total assets within the same four-digit SIC code. This
measure is more appropriate than IPO proceeds, since the size of IPO is related to the size of
industry rivals. To test whether the relative size of IPO firm has a differential impact on industry
rivals, I hypothesize that:

H3:

The larger the relative size of IPO firm, the greater the valuation impact on the
rivals.

3.2.4. Intra-industry reaction and rivals' specific characteristics
The impact of IPO announcements is not expected to be the same for all firms in the
same industry. Rather, the differences in firm characteristics (for example, rival's size, its ability
to take advantage of the future growth potential, and whether it belongs to a concentrated
industry, etc) will dictate the direction and magnitude of rivals' reaction in response to IPO
announcements.
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3.2.4.1. Rival firm size:
Atiase (1985) argues that information production and dissemination are positive function
of firm size. Thus, the expected change in valuation induced by public announcements should be
inversely related to firm size. Atiase reports evidence consistent with this argument in that there
is a larger share price reaction to earnings announcements for small firms relative to that of large
firms. Also, Slovin, Sushka and Bendek (1991) find that industry rivals' excess returns generated
by announcements of going-private transactions are a function of rival size relative to size of the
target. To test whether abnormal returns of rival firms generated by IPO announcements vary,
depending upon the rival's size, I hypothesize that:

H4:

The smaller the size of the rival firm, the greater the valuation impact associated
with an IPO announcement.

I classify rival firms based on whether their size is greater (lower) than industry median.
The intra-industry effects should be greater (smaller) for relatively smaller (larger) rival firms.

3.2.4.2. Rival market-to-book ratio
Market-to-book ratio is a common proxy for growth opportunities. Rivals' growth
opportunities may influence their ability to respond to the competitive threat of a new publicly
traded firm within an industry or to incorporate new growth opportunities available in that
industry.
If IPO announcements signal positive prospects for industry (i.e. future growth
opportunities), then rivals with high market-to-book ratios are likely to react more positively than
those with low market-to-book ratios. On the other hand, especially in less concentrated

36

industries where competitive shifts in market shares might take place, low market-to-book ratio
rivals may not have the ability to respond to the competitive threat of a new publicly traded firm
with greater resources. Therefore, I predict a more positive reaction for rivals with high marketto-book ratios than that of rivals with low market-to-book ratio and a negative reaction for rivals
with low-market-to-book ratios that operate in low concentrated industries. To test whether the
rivals react differently in response to IPO announcements, I hypothesize that:
H5:

If the IPO signals brighter industry prospects, the higher the market-to-book ratio
of rival firm, the greater the valuation effect associated with an IPO
announcement. If the IPO signals comparative advantage information, the lower
the market-to-book ratio of rival firm, the lower the valuation effect associated
with an IPO announcement

I compute the market-to-book ratio as market value of equity plus book value of
liabilities divided by book value of total assets. Within each industry, I classify rival firms as
high (low) market-to-book ratio firms if their market-to-book ratio is above (below) industry
median.
The fifth hypothesis predicts that there is a positive relationship between the rivals' ability
to take advantage of growth opportunities (or to respond to a competitive threat) and their
reaction at the IPO announcements.

3.2.4.3. Industry concentration
Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner (2001) explore the second most cited motivation for a
firm's decision to go public, namely, the product market motive. The argument used to model the
going public decision is based on the interaction between information generated by investors and
analysts of a publicly traded firm, on the one hand, and consumers who discern product quality
from the stock price, on the other hand. The model predicts that only better quality firms will go
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public. Therefore, going public announcements provide a signal to consumers that the IPO firm
has a high quality product. This has a negative impact on rivals' profits, since they charge lower
prices. The product market explanation of going public decisions is relevant especially in
industries where the competitive dynamics play a major role for long term success of companies.
Generally, announcing an IPO conveys bad news for competitors in less concentrated
industries, since the announcement might signal higher product quality to consumers and, thus,
lowers the price the competitors can charge for their products/services. This prediction suggests
that an IPO announcement in low concentrated industry is likely to reveal unfavorable
information for its competitors leading to shift in comparative advantages for non-announcing
firms. To test this implication, I hypothesize that:

H6:

There is a positive relationship between the level of industry concentration and
rivals' abnormal returns. Thus, the higher the level of concentration in the
industry, the higher the valuation effect for the rivals associated with an IPO
announcement.

The Herfindahl Index (HI) is the most used measure of concentration in the industrial
organization literature. HI is computed as the sum of squared market share of each firm relative
to all other firms within the four-digit SIC code. Market share is defined as the firm's annual
sales at the end of fiscal year prior to the IPO announcement divided by industry sales.

3.2.5. IPO price revisions and the valuation impact on rivals
The process of going public is a two-way information channel: the IPO firm reveals
valuable information about its prospects and performance at the filing date and receives
information from informed investors during the registration period known as book-building
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phase (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). With bookbuilding, typically, a preliminary offer price
range is set when firms file their prospectus with SEC. Then, underwriters and issuers market the
offer to prospective investors. If there is a strong demand for the IPO, underwriter will set a
higher offer price relative to mid file price. The difference between offer price and mid file price
range represents the price revisions. Upward/downward price revisions depend on the investors'
demand for IPO and also the underwriter's willingness to keep underpricing within reasonable
limits (i.e. "leaving less money on the table").
Lowry and Schwert (2002) explain the positive relation between initial returns and
subsequent IPO volume as a consequence of information learned during the registration period.
Positive information (upward price revisions) learned during an IPO's book-building phase
results in a high initial return and, consequently, a higher market-to-book value for the IPO firm.
If additional information revealed during book building affects not only the initial returns for the
offering but also the subsequent volume of public offerings in the same industry, it implies
valuation effects for similarly publicly traded firms. In other words, investors in similar firms use
this information to reassess the value of their own firms' future prospects when they observe
upward/downward price revisions. To test whether IPO price revisions have valuation effects on
rival firms, I hypothesize that:

H7:

Rivals experience positive (negative) wealth effects when an IPO undergoes an
upward (downward) price revision on the offer date.
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3.3. Data and Methodology
3.3.1. Sample Selection
In this study I examine the rivals' share price reactions in response to IPO announcements
by industrial firms for 1983-2001 period. The list of IPOs comes from Thompson Financial
Security Database (SDC-Global Issue Database). In addition to the filing date and issue date,
SDC also reports many aspects of the IPOs, such as: offer price, filing price (low, high, mid),
venture backed IPOs, non-venture backed IPOs, etc.
SDC database contains 6,423 IPOs by industrial firms for the 1983-2001 period. I
exclude the following IPOs: rights issue (1), unit IPOs (925), foreign IPOs (2), IPOs with offer
price less than $51 (319) and IPOs not identifiable in the CRSP database. This step reduces the
sample to 5,176 IPOs.
The final sample for industrial firms is constructed in a three-stage process as described
below. In the first stage, I require that each IPO firm to have available financial information in
the Compustat database (total assets, total liabilities, and shares outstanding) in the first year of
listing. This allows me to compute size, growth options and relative size of IPO firm, since the
IPO proceeds is not always a good proxy for the IPO firm size. This criterion reduces the sample
to 3,810 IPOs.
In the second stage, the sample is further reduced when I construct the sample for new
firms. In so doing, I follow three steps. First, I assign each firm for which daily stock returns are
available on the CRSP files to a four-digit SIC code (see Lang and Stulz, 1992). I exclude IPOs
that are in their first year of listing. Second, I construct a list of rival firms that do not have a
major public announcements such as mergers, seasoned equity offerings, stock splits, dividend

1

Benveniste, Busaba, Wilhelm and Yu (2003), Lowry and Schwert (2004), etc eliminate all IPOs whose offer price
is $5 or less.
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and repurchases around IPO announcements (30 day period centered at the IPO filing date).
Finally, to ensure that each IPO firm is matched with a representative portfolio of rivals, I require
that each IPO has at least 5 rivals (same industry, same year), with required financial data (total
assets, sales, total liabilities) available in the Compustat database.
The final sample of IPOs consists of 1,681 IPOs, with 38,791 rivals in 290 different fourdigit SIC codes.

3.3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the frequency of IPOs across years. There are 563 venture
backed IPOs and 1,118-non venture backed IPOs for 1983-2001 period. The bulk of IPOs (40%
of the sample) occurs during 1992-1997 period. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of selected
variables for IPO sample: proceeds, market-to-book ratio, and total assets. The median proceeds
raised by venture-backed IPOs is $30 million, compared to $26 million of non-venture backed
IPOs. In 12 out of 19 years, the median proceeds raised by venture-backed IPOs are greater than
those of non-venture backed IPOs. The median market-to-book ratio of venture backed IPOs is
2.4, whereas that of non-venture backed IPOs is 1.8. The full sample of IPOs has a median
market-to-book ratio of 2.0 and median total assets of $62 million, which are similar to those
reported by Akhigbe et al. (2.05 and $50.36 respectively).
Table 3 describes the selected variables for rivals' sample. A total of 38,791 rivals were
identified for the sample period in 290 different SIC codes. The exact composition of rival
portfolios varies with the timing of the event. The average number of rivals per IPO event is
28.83, the median is 17, the minimum is 5 (to ensure a well representative portfolio of rivals) and
the maximum is 408.
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Table 1
Frequency of IPOs across years
The sample consists of all IPOs by industrial firms during the 1983-2001
period that satisfy the following criteria: (a) firms have financial data on
Compustat during 1983-2001 (both active and research); (b) there are at
least five rival firms within the same four-digit SIC code for any given IPO
event; (c) the offer price is at least $5 and information about filing price
range exists in SDC. The final sample consists of 1,681 IPO events; of
these, 563 are venture backed IPOs and 1,118 are non-venture backed
IPOs.
Year

Venture Backed IPOs

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Total

35
16
19
35
20
14
17
22
29
58
57
27
29
52
36
15
32
39
11
563

Non Venture Backed
IPOs
62
42
52
69
76
27
24
23
38
55
76
98
71
103
100
79
55
40
28
1,118

Total
97
58
71
104
96
41
41
45
67
113
133
125
100
155
136
94
87
79
39
1,681

The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities
to book value of total assets. Total assets and sales are end-of fiscal year values from Compustat
database. The median rival firm has $68.95 million in total assets, $69.37 million in sales and a
market to book ratio of 1.54. Akhigbe et al. report a median market-to-book ratio of 1.1 and a
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for IPOs sample
The sample consists of all IPOs by industrial firms during the 1983-2001. To enter in the sample, the following criteria are
required: firms have financial data on Compustat during 1983-2001 (both active and research), there are at least five rival firms
within the same four-digit SIC for any given IPO event and the offer price is at least $5 and information about filing price range
exists in SDC. Market value is computed as market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities. Market/Book is the ratio of
market value to total assets.
Non-Venture Backed IPOs
Venture Backed IPOs
Full Sample
Market/
Market/
Market/
Proceeds
Total
Total
Total
Book
Proceeds Book Value
Proceeds
Book
Year
N
N
N
Assets
Assets
Assets
Value
Value
Medians
Medians
Medians
1983
62
13.4
1.8
31.9
35
15.3
2.5
26.9
97
14.9
2.0
29.0
1984
42
7.8
1.5
23.6
16
12.0
1.9
33.7
58
8.6
1.6
27.9
1985
52
11.7
2.1
30.7
19
15.2
1.8
34.4
71
13.0
2.1
33.5
1986
69
12.0
1.7
31.7
35
14.9
2.1
34.6
104
12.2
1.8
31.9
1987
76
15.1
1.5
47.6
20
17.6
1.7
41.3
96
16.5
1.5
45.6
1988
27
17.2
1.8
69.7
14
15.9
2.5
44.9
41
16.5
2.3
57.7
1989
24
20.9
1.5
113.0
17
15.2
2.3
36.7
41
19.6
2.0
62.2
1990
23
22.5
1.3
54.8
22
24.6
1.9
66.4
45
24.2
1.5
62.7
1991
38
24.9
1.7
87.8
29
32.5
2.8
65.3
67
29.0
2.2
75.6
1992
55
34.4
2.0
75.2
58
32.1
2.4
61.8
113
33.4
2.1
69.9
1993
76
22.7
1.9
70.8
57
27.0
2.0
56.1
133
25.2
2.0
64.9
1994
98
22.5
1.8
44.0
27
17.6
2.3
38.6
125
22.4
1.8
43.7
1995
71
31.5
2.3
75.1
29
33.6
2.7
63.8
100
33.5
2.3
66.6
1996
103
31.9
2.4
58.8
52
43.0
2.5
68.0
155
33.6
2.4
63.2
1997
100
29.0
2.1
67.7
36
35.9
3.8
65.3
136
32.8
2.3
67.6
1998
79
55.3
1.5
152.4
15
35.0
1.9
66.8
94
49.5
1.7
105.5
1999
55
54.0
2.4
153.8
32
67.9
3.4
138.9
87
64.4
3.4
146.7
2000
40
77.0
1.6
155.1
39
75.0
2.2
105.3
79
75.0
1.9
135.6
2001
28
106.1
2.3
193.5
11
90.0
2.5
193.7
39
93.8
2.4
193.7
Total
1,118
26.0
1.8
63.1
563
30.0
2.4
60.8 1,681
27.5
2.0
62.0
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median total assets of $51.74 million for the industry rivals' sample. The differences might be
explained by the fact that the authors match the IPOs with at least one rival firm in the same
four-digit SIC code, whereas in this study I require at least five firms in the same four-digit SIC
code to ensure a well representative portfolio.

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Rivals' Sample
The sample consists of all rival firms for 1983-2001 period that
satisfy the following criteria: they have daily stock returns
available in the CRSP database, there are at least 5 rival firms
in each four-digit SIC code with available financial data in the
Compustat database for any given IPO, rival firms have no
major confounding event around IPO announcements.

Year
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Total

N
1,616
1,170
1,432
2,041
1,884
1,058
1,153
1,200
1,424
2,225
2,661
2,743
2,647
3,266
3,336
2,749
2,167
2,473
1,546
38,791

Rival firms
Total
Sales
M/B
Assets
Median Median Median
44.46
56.32
1.48
37.94
46.75
1.34
37.19
47.19
1.43
40.72
43.51
1.38
45.05
46.94
1.27
32.14
35.32
1.29
46.68
48.98
1.39
40.63
43.39
1.27
51.38
65.82
1.55
61.82
67.18
1.48
69.59
79.63
1.57
77.65
86.06
1.49
78.37
80.97
1.75
87.41
87.67
1.68
84.34
77.26
1.78
89.23
83.07
1.61
115.05 104.27
1.90
120.48
96.20
1.57
104.65
65.87
1.83
68.95
69.37
1.54
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3.3.3. Methodology
To capture the valuation effects of industry rivals in response to IPO announcements, I
use event study methodology to measure the industry rivals' share price reaction. Day 0 is the
registration date on the Registered Offerings of Securities tape of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Daily share prices for rivals' sample are from the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP). To measure abnormal returns, I employ the market-adjusted model
(Brown and Warner, 1985).
A p ,t = R p ,t − Rm ,t , where Rm ,t is the return on the CRSP value weighted index for day t.
This model is well specified when securities come from the same industry group and especially
when there is a clustering in events. Brown and Warner point out that there could be a high
degree of cross-sectional dependence in market/market adjusted model and potential
misspecification. To account for potential cross-correlation of returns induced by a clustering of
industry observations in calendar time, I construct an equally weighted portfolio of rival firms
within the same industry (4-digit SIC code) and perform event tests on the returns to the industry
portfolios. To test whether there is a significant difference in mean (median) cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) between two subsamples, I use t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
respectively.
The next step is to analyze the cross-sectional variation in intra-industry information
effects of IPO announcements. Previous studies show that industry characteristic, rival-specific
characteristics and event-specific characteristics can explain the variations in intra-industry
information effects. Based on theoretical predictions of going public decision, I estimate the
following model:
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RivalCARi = α 0 + α1CONCMKTi + α 2 RivalSIZEi + α 3 RivalM / Bi +
+ α 4VCbackedIPOi + α 5 IPO _ SIZEi + α 6 M / Bi * CONCMKTi + ε i

The dependent variable is the three-day CAR of each industry rival in response to the
announced initial public offering of firm i. CONCMKTi is the pre-IPO concentration level in the
4-digit SIC code. I use Herfindahl Index (HI) to measure the concentration level. The
concentration variable is obtained by multiplying the HI by a dummy variable that takes on a
value of one if rival operates in a highly concentrated industry (HI>median industry) and zero
otherwise. RivalSIZEi equals 1 if the rival size (proxied by pre-IPO total assets) exceeds industry
median. RivalM / Bi equals 1 if the M/B ratio of rival firm exceeds industry median.
VCbackedIPOi is an interactor variable that takes value of one if IPO is venture backed and zero
otherwise. IPO _ SIZEi is the relative size of IPO firm computed as the ratio of IPO firm's total
assets to rival's total assets.
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3.4. Empirical Results
3.4.1. Rivals' valuation effects at the IPO announcement date:
I use three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for equally-weighted rival portfolios
as a measure of information transferred from IPO firms to rivals. Table 4 presents both mean and
median CARs for all rivals and for subsamples based on rivals' characteristics. Both mean
(0.371%) and median (0.279%) CARs for the entire sample are positive and significantly
different from zero, which suggest that going public decisions have positive externalities effects
on existing publicly held firms that share a common valuation factor. Benveniste, Busaba,
Wilhelm and Yu (2003) find a positive effect of going public decisions on privately held firms
within the same industry. The likelihood of going public is determined by the factors such as:
previous IPOs' underpricing, price revisions, and withdrawals. They conclude that firms decide
to go public when they observe positive outcomes (i.e. less underpricing) from their
contemporaries (i.e. firms that go public in about the same time). The positive reaction for rivals
support the hypothesis that going public decisions signal positive prospects for industry and this
information conveyed at the filing date is transferred to similar publicly traded firms.
When discussing the hypotheses, I indicated that the net wealth effect of an IPO on its
rivals is the sum of potentially two opposing consequences. It is possible that some rivals react
positively and some negatively. Partitioning the rivals based on their characteristics (market-tobook value, size), generate different reactions in response to IPO announcements. Table 4 shows
that rivals with market-to-book value higher than the industry median experience a positive and
significant reaction (0.356%) in response to IPO announcements, whereas those with market-tobook value below industry median have no valuation changes (at the median level). The median
reaction of large size rivals is positive and significant (0.302%), but the median reaction of small
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size rivals is insignificant. This is inconsistent with previous studies in intra-industry information
transfer that document a negative relation between the expected change in valuation induced by a
public announcement and firm size (Atiase, 1985, and Slovin et al., 1991). It might be the case
that the insignificant reaction of small size rivals is the result of offsetting positive and negative
effects.

Table 4
Rivals' reaction in response to IPO announcements
This table presents 3-day mean and median announcement period cumulative
abnormal return (%) for rival portfolios in response to initial public offerings
conducted during 1983-2001 period. The abnormal returns are equally weighted
market adjusted returns. N is the number of observations that have the same
four-digit SIC code as IPO firms, have no major confounding event around IPO
announcements and have announcement period return available on CRSP. ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
N
38,791

Mean
0.371***

Median
0.279**

Large size rivals
(above industry median)

21,162

0.302***

0.258**

Small size rivals
(below industry median)

17,629

0.433***

0.061

High M/B rivals
(above industry median)

19,177

0.618***

0.356***

Low M/B rivals
(below industry median)

19,614

0.139

All rivals

-0.103

48

3.4.2. Variations in Rivals’ Abnormal Returns
3.4.2.1. Univariate Analysis
The major hypothesis in this study is that venture backed IPOs signal positive
information about the related industry and this has a significant positive impact on stock prices
of rival companies. To shed more light on the rivals' valuation effects in response to IPO
announcements, I analyze the rivals' CARs for two different subgroups, based on whether IPO is
venture backed or not. Within each group, I split the sample into subgroups based on rivals'
specific characteristics (market-to-book ratio, size and industry concentration). Previous studies
show that venture backed IPOs convey positive signals to the market (Brav and Gompers, 1997)
and, therefore, investors might incorporate these expectations at the filing date.
Table 5 shows the CARs for rival portfolios in response to venture backed IPOs (Panel
A) and non-venture backed IPOs (Panel B). The median wealth effect experienced by rivals
when an IPO is venture backed is positive (0.293%) and significant at the 1% level. The median
CARs, however, are insignificant for rivals when IPOs are not venture-backed. These results
imply that the average positive reaction of rivals is driven by the presence of venture backed
IPOs. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a venture backed IPO signals better prospects
for the IPO-affiliated industry than when an IPO is not backed by venture capitalist.
Table 5 also reveals that when IPOs are venture backed, higher M/B rivals enjoy positive
and statistically significant wealth gains. Although lower M/B rivals show positive gain, this
result is not significant. On the other hand, when IPOs are non-venture backed, higher M/B rivals
experience positive but insignificant wealth gain, while lower M/B rivals negative (significant at
the 10% level) abnormal returns. These results lead me to conclude that the positive effect
signaled by venture-backed IPOs exceeds the negative (competitive) effect due to a new entrant,
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but when an IPO is not backed by venture capital, the negative effect is more pronounced for
lower M/B (poorer performing) rivals.
Based on industry concentration level, rivals reaction in response to venture backed IPOs,
is positive and significant, but insignificant in response to non venture backed IPOs. This
suggests that regardless of the level of competition in the industry they operate, investors in rival
firms interpret the positive signal of venture backed IPO announcements as having industry wide
implications. The magnitude of rivals' reaction is higher for those in less concentrated (more
competitive) industries (0.390%) than those in highly concentrated industries (0.240%).
However, the differential impact is not statistically significant. It seems that rival firms in highly
concentrated industries get lower net benefits from the positive information signaled by venture
backed IPO announcements. In the absence of a venture-backed IPO, neither high- nor lowconcentration rivals win.
Lang and Stulz (1992) provide the important result that information transfer can differ
across industries depending on the concentration level. Their results suggest that an
announcement made by a firm in a low concentrated industry is likely to reveal comparative
information for industry rivals. Following their procedure, I use Herfindhal Index to split the
rivals in highly concentrated (above median HI) and less concentrated (below median HI)
groups.
Table 6 shows the mean and median 3-day CARs for both groups. At the mean level,
rivals in low concentrated industries (i.e. high competition) have a higher reaction than those in
highly concentrated industries; however, the difference between the two groups (High-Low) is
not statistically significant.
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Table 5
CARs for rival industry portfolios partitioned by event and rivals' characteristics
This table shows 3-day CARs based on whether IPOs are venture backed or not. Within each group, I split the sample in subgroups based
on rivals' specific characteristics (market-to-book ratio, size, and industry concentration level). The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of
market value of equity plus book value of liabilities to book value of total assets. Rival size is proxied by total assets. The level of
concentration is measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) defined as the sum of square market share of each firm in the four-digit SIC code. Panel
A presents the mean and median CARs for rival industry portfolios in response to venture-backed IPO announcements. Panel B presents the
mean and median CARs for rival industry portfolios in response to non-venture backed IPO announcements. The t-statistic and Wilcoxon-Z
are used to test statistical differences in mean and median between two subsamples. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Rivals' reaction in response to
Panel B: Rivals' reaction in response to
Difference (VC-non VC)
venture backed IPOs
non-venture backed IPOs
N
Mean
Median
N
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
All
14,534
0.511***
0.293***
24,257
0.060
-0.063
0.451*
0.356***
> median M/B
7,085
0.578***
0.377**
12,092
0.201*
0.110
0.377*
0.267**
≤ median M/B
7,449
0.478***
0.177
12,165
-0.062
-0.192*
0.540**
0.369**
Mean Difference
0.100
0.263*
( High-Low)
Median Difference
0.200
0.302*
(High-Low)
>median size
7,892
0.311***
0.168
13,270
0.085
-0.032
0.226*
0.200*
≤ median size
6,642
0.726***
0.270
10,987
-0.009
-0.143
0.735***
0.413**
Mean Difference
-0.415
0.094
( Large-Small)
Median Difference
-0.102
0.111
(Large-Small)
> median HI
6,684
0.570**
0.240*
11,811
0.001
-0.080
0.569**
0.320**
≤ median HI
7,850
0.400**
0.390*
12,446
0.200*
-0.040
0.200
0.430***
Mean Difference
0.170
-0.200
( High-Low)
Median Difference
-0.150
-0.040
(High-Low)
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Table 6
Rivals' cumulative abnormal returns classified
by level of concentration
This table shows mean and median 3-day equally weighted market
adjusted returns for rival firms classified by level of concentration.
The level of concentration is measured by Herfindahl Index (HI)
defined as the sum of square market share of each firm in the fourdigit SIC code. The market share is the firm's annual sales at the fiscal
year-end prior to IPO announcement as a percentage of the industry's.
The t-statistic and Wilcoxon-Z are used to test statistical differences in
mean and median between two subsamples. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
HI
>median
≤ median
Difference in mean
Difference in median

N (rivals)
18,495

Mean
0.175*

Median
0.023

20,296

0.270**
-0.096

0.115
-0.093

To further examine the impact of industry concentration level on rivals' reaction in
response to IPO announcements, I measure the information transferred based on various crossclassifications: industry concentration and rivals' market-to-book value and industry
concentration and rivals' size. Table 7 presents the mean and median 3-day CARs for rival
portfolios based on both rivals' and industries' specific characteristics. Panel A shows the rivals'
reaction in response to venture backed IPOs. The significant negative CAR of 0.14% suggests
that rivals with low market-to-book value that operate in less concentrated industries have a
competitive disadvantage when a competitor goes public. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that, in a competitive environment (low concentration), rivals with low growth opportunities
(poor performing rivals) do not have the ability to respond to the competitive threat of a new
entrant. Rivals with high market-to-book value experience positive valuation effects (0.07%) if
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they operate in highly concentrated industries and have no significant valuation changes if they
operate in less concentrated industries. Consistent with Atiase's (1985) argument, rivals' size
plays an important role in information transferred. Depending on the level of concentration and
rival's size, the magnitude of information transferred differs. At the median level, for example,
small size rivals' CAR is more pronounced in less concentrated industries (-0.19%) than in
highly concentrated industries. These results suggest that small size rivals are more vulnerable in
a competitive environment.
When IPOs are not venture backed, all rivals irrespective of the quality (above- and
below median M/B) or size (above- or below-median size) lose (significant at least at the 10%
level) in less concentrated industries. This result implies that in the absence of venture capitalists
at the time of IPO, competitive effect is more pronounced.

3.4.2.2. Relative size of IPO firm
The size of IPO firm relative to the size of industry rivals may convey different
information to industry rivals. The larger the relative size of IPO firm, the greater the impact on
industry rivals' reactions, because large IPO firms convey more information for industry
counterparts. Table 8 shows the impact of IPO firms' size on industry rivals' valuation effects.
Rivals are classified in quartiles, based on the relative size of IPO firm (smallest IPO firms-1,
largest IPO firms-4). Except for quartile 1, both mean and median rivals CARs are positive and
significant. This suggests that relatively small IPO firms do not have a significant impact on
rivals, but as the relative size of IPO firm increases (quartile 2 to quartile 4), rivals experience
significant wealth gains in response to IPO announcements. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that the larger the relative size of IPO firm, the higher the rivals' reaction. The
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difference in mean/median between quartile 1 and quartile 4 is significant different for all
windows. This implies that larger IPOs (Q4) convey more information than smaller IPOs (Q1)
and this information has industry-wide implications.

Table 7
Two-way classification of industry rivals' portfolios
This table presents the mean (median) 3-day rivals' CARs based on various crossclassifications. HI is the Herfindhal Index defined as the sum of square market share of
each firm in the four-digit SIC code. The market share is the firm's annual sales at the fiscal
year-end prior to IPO announcement as a percentage of the industry's. The market-to-book
ratio is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of liabilities to book value of
total assets. Rival size is proxied by total assets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
A. Venture Backed IPOs (N=563)
Above median HI
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
Above median M/B
3331
0.75**
0.07*
Below median M/B
3353
0.50**
-0.13

Below median HI
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
3754
0.38*
-0.11
4096
0.21
-0.14*

Above median HI
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
3679
0.36**
-0.03
3005
0.93**
-0.08

Below median HI
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
4213
0.20*
-0.08
3637
0.41
-0.19*

B. Non Venture Backed IPOs (N=1,118)
Above median HI
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
Above median M/B
5866
0.24*
-0.24*
Below median M/B
5945
0.00
-0.34**

Below median HI
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
6226
0.06
-0.23*
6220
0.04
-0.49**

Above median HI
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
6367
0.17*
-0.15
5444
0.06
-0.47**

Below median HI
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
6903
0.00
-0.27*
5543
0.03
-0.48*

Above median size
Below median size

Above median size
Below median size
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Table 8
The impact of the relative size of IPO firm on industry rivals
This table shows the median/mean CARs for rival portfolios classified by the relative size
of IPO firm. Rival firms include firms on Compustat that have the same four-digit SIC
code as IPO firm, do not a have a major public announcement around IPO filing date and
have returns available on CRSP database. The sample covers the 1983-2001 period. The
relative size of IPO firm is defined as the ratio of IPO firm's total assets to rival's total
assets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Panel A
Q1
Smallest
IPO firms
Median

Relative size of IPO firm
Q2
Q3

Median

Median

Q4
Largest IPO
firms
Median

Q1-Q4

p-value

CAR (-1, 0)

0.12

0.15***

0.23***

0.18***

0.00

CAR (-1,1)

0.12

0.25***

0.29***

0.33***

0.03

CAR (-2, 2)

0.11

0.36**

0.41***

0.63***

0.00

Q1-Q4

p-value

Panel B
Q1
Smallest
IPO firms
Mean

Relative size of IPO firm
Q2
Q3

Mean

Mean

Q4
Largest IPO
firms
Mean

CAR (-1, 0)

-0.01

0.18**

0.23***

0.20***

0.01

CAR (-1,1)

0.11

0.17**

0.19**

0.28***

0.01

CAR (-2, 2)

0.08

0.22**

0.30**

0.47***

0.00
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3.4.2.3. Multivariate analysis
The univariate results provide evidence that rival firms react differently to IPO
announcements depending upon event specific characteristics and rivals' specific characteristics.
To examine the cross-sectional variation in intra-industry information effects of IPO
announcements, I estimate the following model:

RivalCARi = α 0 + α1CONCMKTi + α 2 RivalSIZEi + α 3 RivalM / Bi +
+ α 4VCbackedIPOi + α 5 IPO _ SIZEi + α 6 M / Bi * HI i + ε i

The abnormal returns are computed for each individual rival using market-adjusted
model. The dependent variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns of each individual rival
and the independent variables are factors that may explain the variation in rivals' valuation
effects in response to IPO announcements. CONCMKTi is the pre-IPO concentration level in the
4-digit SIC code. I use Herfindahl Index (HI) to measure the concentration level. The
concentration variable is obtained by multiplying the HI by a dummy variable that takes on a
value of one if HI>median and zero otherwise. RivalSIZEi equals 1 if the rival size (proxied by
total assets, prior to the IPO announcement) exceeds industry median. RivalM / Bi equals 1 if
the M/B ratio of rival firm exceeds industry median. VCbackedIPOi is an interactor variable that
takes value of one if IPO is venture backed and zero otherwise. IPO _ SIZEi is the relative size
of IPO firm computed as the ratio of IPO firm's total assets to rival's total assets.
Table 9 presents the cross-sectional results based on individual rivals' CARs at the IPO filing
date. Model 1 shows the results when only the factors related to IPO's specific characteristics are
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Table 9
Cross-sectional variation in rivals' valuation effects
This table shows the results of individual rival valuation effects in response to an IPO
filing. The dependent variable is the 3-day individual rival abnormal returns. Relative size
of IPO firm is the ratio of IPO firm's total assets to rival's total assets. VC backed IPO is
equal to 1 if IPO is venture backed and zero otherwise. HI is equal to 1 if the rival operates
in a highly concentrated industry and zero otherwise. Rival's M/B equals 1 if it exceeds the
industry median. M/B is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of liabilities to
book value of total assets. Rival's relative size equals 1 if rival size exceeds the industry
median. Rival size is proxied by its total assets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept

0.111***

0.187**

0.160

0.223

Relative size of IPO
firm
VC backed IPO

0.055**

0.055**

0.061**

0.360***

0.354***

0.335***

HI dummy

0.144*

0.161*

Rivals' M/B

0.084**

0.090**

Rival size relative to
industry

-0.109

-0.118

-0.199

High M/B, High HI

0.376**

High M/B, Low HI

0.168**

Low M/B, High HI

0.217*

R2

0.093

0.095

0.103

0.110

included in the model. Consistent with findings in the univariate analysis, rivals have positive
and significant valuation effects (0.360%) when the IPO is venture backed. This result is
consistent with Lerner (1994) and Brav and Gompers (1997) who demonstrate that venture
backed IPOs are successful in timing the market and better than non-venture backed IPOs. The
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implication is that the signaling and timing ability of venture backed IPOs have a positive impact
on industry rivals; they experience significant positive valuation effects because investors
reassess the value of similar existing publicly traded firms at the time a venture capitalist brings a
firm public. The positive coefficient estimate on relative size of IPO firm (0.055%) suggests that
the larger the size of IPO firm relative to industry counterparts, the higher the individual rival's
reaction. This suggests that larger IPO firms relative to their rivals convey more information than
small IPO firms.
Model 2 presents the results for factors related to industry and rivals' specific
characteristics. The degree of industry concentration and level of rivals' growth opportunities are
positively related to rival valuation effects. However, the coefficient estimate on rival size is not
statistically significant. This implies that rival size is not an important determinant in explaining
cross-sectional variation in individual rivals' valuation effects.
Model 3 controls for both event specific factors and rivals specific factors,
simultaneously. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported when the models are
estimated separately.
Model 4 adds the interaction between market-to-book ratio and concentration level
measured by Herfindahl Index. There are four possible categories: high M/B, high HI; high M/B,
low HI; low M/B, high HI and low M/B, low HI. For this case, a set of binary variables is
necessary. To avoid the dummy variable trap, I drop the dummy variable for the last category
(low M/B, low HI). The coefficient for high M/B, high HI category is positive (0.376%) and
significant at 5% level which implies that rivals with high growth options in highly concentrated
industries have higher reaction than those with low growth options that operate in less
concentrated industries. Rivals with high market-to book value that operate in less concentrated
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industries also have higher reaction than those with low market-to-book value in less
concentrated industries (0.168%). This suggests that in a competitive environment, rivals with
high market-to-book value have a higher propensity to take advantage of growth options signaled
at the IPO filing date, or to respond to a competitive threat of a new incumbent. Low market-tobook rivals that operate in highly concentrated industries react more than those with the same
degree of valuation but operating in less concentrated industries (0.217%). These results are
consistent with those presented in Table 7.

3.4.3. Impact of Price Revisions on Rivals' Valuation
The book-building phase (the period between filing date and offer date) is a two-way
information channel. Going public firms reveal information at the time they file an initial public
offering prospectus and receive information (positive/negative) from informed investors during
the road show. Based on the type of information received, firms adjust the offer price
(upward/downward) and make public the new information at the time of listing. To test the
hypothesis that price revisions have a significant impact on rivals in the same industry, I divide
the IPO sample in upward price revisions IPOs and downward price revisions. Then, I calculate
rival portfolios CARs for different event windows (day 0 is the offer day). Table 10 shows the
median CARs for rival portfolios in response to upward/downward IPO price revisions. For all
event windows, the median CARs is negative and statistically significant in response to
downward price revisions. As expected, negative information revealed in the form of downward
price revisions makes rivals worse off and this can be explained as rivals being overly optimistic
about the future prospects within the industry at the time the IPO firm files with SEC. On the
other hand, the median CARs is insignificant in response to upward price revisions, which
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Table 10
Rivals' cumulative abnormal returns in response to
IPO price revisions

This table presents the median CARs for rival firms classified by the direction of IPO price
revisions (upward and downward). The event day (0) is the offering day. The sample covers
the 1983-2001 period. Price revisions equal the ratio of (offer price-mid filing price) to mid
filing price. The Wilcoxon rank sum test performs statistical differences in median between
two independent subsamples. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
Median CARs
(-1, 0)
IPO price
revisions*

Upward
(N=647 IPOs)
Downward
(N=840 IPOs)

Difference in median
*194 IPOs have no price revisions

(-1, 1)

-0.067

-0.074

-0.220***

-0.333***

-0.153***

-0.259***

(-2, 2)
-0.225
-0.398***
-0.172***

which suggests that rivals do not react to subsequent information released, if this information is
positive. It might be the case that they already incorporated the positive information generated by
going public decisions at the filing date, or there are offsetting positive and negative effects. To
further examine the impact of price revisions on rival's valuation effects, I look at the variation of
industry rival portfolios CARs for subsamples of venture backed IPOs and non-venture backed
IPOs. Table 11 (Panel A) shows that for venture-backed IPOs, downward price revisions have
negative impact on rivals, while upward revisions create positive wealth for rivals. However,
wealth loss under downward revision far exceeds the wealth gains resulting from upward
revisions. Upward price revision information generates opposite reactions for industry rivals.
Positive and significant reaction is documented for venture backed IPOs sample (0.111%) but
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negative and significant reaction for non-venture backed IPOs sample (-0.228%). This implies
that investors in rival firms interpret the positive information at the offering day as good news for
industry only when this is certified by a venture capitalist.
In Panel B, the results show that regardless of rivals' characteristics, downward price
revisions adversely affect rival firms within the same industry. The magnitude of information
transfer is higher for small size, low market-to-book rivals and for those in low concentrated
industries. Rivals reaction in response to upward price revisions is differentiated based on their
characteristics. The results show that only high market-to-book rivals have the ability to take
advantage of positive prospects available in the industry. However, their reaction is small
(0.019%) and marginally significant at 10% level.
Overall, the results in Table 11 are consistent with hypothesis that negative information
revealed in the form of downward price revisions adversely impacts rival firms within the same
industry.
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Table 11
Impact of price revisions partitioned by event and rivals' specific characteristics
This table shows 3-day rivals CARs in response to upward/downward price revisions (day 0 is the offer day). Within each group
(downward/upward), I split the sample in subgroups based on event characteristics (venture backed or non-venture backed IPOS) and
rivals' specific characteristics (market-to-book ratio, size, and industry concentration level). The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of
market value of equity plus book value of liabilities to book value of total assets. Rival size is proxied by total assets. The level of
concentration is measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) defined as the sum of square market share of each firm in the four-digit SIC code.
Panel A shows the impact of price revisions and event specific characteristic. Panel B shows the impact of price revisions and rivals'
specific characteristics. The t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test performs the statistical differences in means/medians for two
subsamples. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Impact of price revisions and event specific characteristics
Downward price revisions
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
Venture backed IPOs
5,894
-0.260**
-0.313**
Non-venture backed IPOs
11,674
-0.240*
-0.341**
Difference (non-VC-VC)
0.020
-0.028
Panel B: Impact of price revisions and rivals' specific characteristics
Downward price revisions
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
Above median size
9,651
-0.234*
-0.302**
Below median size
7,917
-0.384**
-0.367**
Difference (S-L)
-0.150*
-0.065
Above median M/B
8,700
-0.210
-0.230**
Below Median M/B
8,868
-0.471*
-0.410**
Difference (L-H)
-0.261*
-0.18
Above median HI
8,654
-0.144**
-0.227**
Below median HI
8,914
-0.365**
-0.415**
Difference (L-H)
-0.221*
-0.188
*194 IPOs have no price revisions

Upward price revisions
CAR (%)
N
Mean
Median
7,351
0.190** 0.111*
9,022
-0.350** -0.228*
-0.540*
-0.339*

N
9,036
7,337
7,993
8,380
7,479
8,894

Upward price revisions
CAR (%)
Mean
Median
0.040
0.051
-0.230** -0.259*
-0.270** -0.310**
0.100
0.019*
0.231** -0.165*
0.131
-0.184**
-0.054
-0.102
-0.014
-0.038
0.040
0.064

Difference (D-U)
Mean
Median
-0.450**
-0.424**
0.110
-0.113

Difference (D-U)
Mean
Median
-0.274*
-0.353**
-0.154*
-0.108
-0.310**
-0.702***

-0.249**
-0.245*

-0.090
-0.351***

-0.125
-0.377**
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3.5. Summary and conclusions
This study provides evidence that going public decisions have positive informational
externalities on existing publicly traded firms within the same industry. The positive valuation
effects of rival firms are driven by venture backed IPOs externality which indicates that the
presence of venture capitalists signals positive prospects for industry and this information is
transferred to industry rivals. This finding is consistent with hypothesis that a venture backed
IPO signals superior information to the market than a non-venture backed IPO and investors
react differently depending on the event specific characteristics. Another important result is that
rivals with high market-to-book value experience positive and significant valuation effects in
response to venture backed IPOs and low market-to-book value rivals have negative and
significant valuation effects in response to non-venture backed IPOs. This implies that high
market-to-book rivals have the ability to incorporate future growth opportunities available within
an industry when this information is signaled at the filing date. On the other hand, low market-tobook rivals that operate in low concentrated industries may have a competitive disadvantage
when a non-venture backed IPO firm enters, probably because the newly public firm is more
technologically advanced than its rivals.
One important factor that influences the direction and magnitude of rivals' valuation
effects is the relative size of IPO firm. The evidence suggests that the larger the size of IPO firm
relative to industry counterparts, the greater the impact on rivals. Rivals experience more
positive wealth effects when a relatively larger firm goes public.
When a venture-backed IPO undergoes downward price revision at the offering date, it
entails negative valuation consequence for rivals. However, the opposite does not hold when
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upward price revisions occur. It might be the case that they already incorporated the positive
information generated by going public decisions at the filing date.
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CHAPTER IV
INFORMATIONAL EXTERNALITIES OF BANK INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERINGS

4.1. Introduction
In Chapter 3, I have examined the information externalities surrounding IPO
announcements of industrial firms. In this Chapter, I study the informational externalities
resulting from IPO announcements of banking firms. The need for this separate investigation
stems from prevailing arguments that range from one extreme that bank announcements should
not contain information externalities to the other that banks have greater externalities than
industrial firms.
Black (1975) and Fama (1980) argue that there are no external information effects from
individual bank actions. They demonstrate that banks are like open-end mutual funds in which
liabilities are claims on the bank's asset portfolio that can be marked to market continuously.
Therefore, asset activities are governed by the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958), implying that
bank asset portfolio decisions are irrelevant to firm value. This view implies that bank loans do
not provide any informational advantage relative to publicly traded debt securities, and therefore
there should be no informational externalities from individual bank announcements such as
initial public offerings.
On the other hand, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984, 1991), Ramakrishnan
and Thakor (1984), and Gorton (1985) make a strong case for the existence of information
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externalities linked to bank announcements. Their argument goes as follows. Banks collect and
process information about loan customers and monitor borrower activities. These informational
advantages make bank loans a cost-efficient mechanism of private external financing for some
set of borrowers, especially those with favorable private information. In practice, there is
difficulty of marking bank loan portfolios to market due to confidentiality of bank-borrower
relationship and limited disclosure about lending agreements. Therefore, bank claims held by
shareholders and creditors are unlikely to accurately reflect asymmetric information impounded
in bank loan portfolios. Moreover, banks are not required to disclose information about
individual loans and loan portfolio quality. Bank managers have considerable flexibility to adjust
publicly disclosed accounting measures of loan portfolio quality. Thus, according to this
viewpoint, asymmetric information impounded in bank loan portfolios gives rise to information
externalities related to bank announcements.
These characteristics of the information structure of bank operations limit the market's
access to information needed to assess individual bank value and risk, creating the potential for
informational externalities.
Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek, 1992) posit that a bank public announcement might
generate external information effects on other banks to an extent not found in industrial sector.
They argue that the presence of bank capital regulation increases the informational externalities
of bank managerial decisions. Regulators impose accounting based minimum capital-to-asset
ratios and specify which bank liabilities qualify for regulatory capital. The dominant component
in the required minimum is the book value of equity and, therefore is not related to the market
value of equity. Unfavorable outcomes of regulator examinations can increase pressure on bank
managers to raise regulatory capital, i.e. through an initial public offer. Thus, a bank decision to
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go public is not entirely a voluntary action as it is for unregulated, industrial firms, but it reflects
private information held by managers and regulators about bank's capital and the value of its loan
portfolio.
Empirical findings in the finance literature also support a separate look at industrial and
banking firms. For example, the underpricing of IPOs undertaken by financial institutions is
6.5% (Ritter, 1991) relative to an average of 11.8% for a sample of industrial firms during 19851997. Ritter (1991) also documents that IPOs undertaken by industrial firms underperform a
size-and-industry matched sample for three years after going public, while financial institutions
outperform the benchmark by almost 68% over the same period. Similar results are documented
by Houge and Loughran (1999) who find that bank IPOs outperform various benchmarks for a
two-year period, but this performance declines in the third year. They attribute this result to
higher loan losses resulting from changes in the post-IPO risk of the banks' loan portfolios.
Conflicting theoretical arguments on information externalities of industrial versus
banking firms coupled with differences in empirical results pertaining to these two groups
prompt me to examine banking firms1 separately from industrial firms. In this Chapter, I analyze
whether bank IPO announcements have external information effects on rival banks. First, I
examine the information externalities effects in aggregate for bank IPO announcements, as well
as the distribution of rival bank abnormal returns in response to each announcement. In this way,
I focus on how event-specific and bank-specific factors explain the variation of rival bank
responses to IPO announcements.

1

In this study, no distinction is made between the organizational structure of banks, savings and loans, bank holding
companies. Therefore, the term bank" is meant to include banks, thrifts, and bank holding companies.
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4.2. Literature survey
The potential for informational externalities in the banking industry has been empirically
examined for various bank announcements. Slovin et al. (1992) compare the informational
externalities of bank seasoned equity offerings with those of industrial firms. Given the
difference in information structure between banking and the industrial sector, they hypothesize
that bank SEOs have higher externalities for their industry counterparts than those announced by
industrial firms. The results demonstrate that private information structure of bank lending,
combined with the bank regulation process, induce the financial market to interpret stock
issuance announcements as negative signals of value for other commercial banking firms. In
contrast, no significant intra-industry effect is documented for rivals of industrial firms that
announce seasoned equity issues, suggesting that SEOs release only firm specific information
with no external effects for other firms that share a common valuation factor.
Docking et al. (1997) examine the intra-industry effects of loan-loss reserve (LLR)
additions and find significant contagion effects for non-announcing money-center banks and
regional banks following LLR announcements by other regional banks. The negative contagion
effects are most clearly associated with LLR announcements by regional banks from the New
England, Mid-Atlantic and Southwest regions. They find no significant contagion effects in other
regions, which suggests that the overall negative contagion effects associated with regional bank
LLR announcements stem from a small subset of the overall group of regional banks. Also, there
is a difference in non-announcing regional banks' reaction and that of money center banks. On
average, regional banks have more negative effects than money center banks. As suggested by
Madura and McDaniel (1989), the market knows relatively less about the quality of regional
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bank loan portfolios, which is why regional bank LLR announcements are more informative than
money-center bank announcements.
Bank acquisition events have potential for contagion effects for target banks' rivals.
Akhigbe and Madura (1999) show that investors in rival banks interpret the information content
of bank acquisitions positively, on average. The rivals' valuation effects are positively related to
the valuation of target banks and inversely related to the size and prior performance of rival
banks. Also, the valuation effects are more favorable for rivals that are ultimately acquired in
two years. Therefore, not only event specific characteristics are informative for rival banks, but
also the strength of the signal transmitted is a function of rival banks' characteristics, as a lower
size and weaker performer rival bank may face the probability of subsequently being acquired.
The extensiveness of asymmetric information at banks, which is central to bank models,
has been examined simultaneously for dividend reductions and regulatory enforcement actions
(Slovin et al., 1999). The combination of a bank announcement and a regulatory enforcement
action may have a different impact on rival banks than a pure bank announcement.
Consequently, constraints on competition in banking that result from governmental restrictions
on entry and expansion may create externalities to dividend reductions. Moreover, regulations
restrict bank managerial activities and, as a result, lead to a direct influence on bank dividend
policy. Hence, regulation may affect the degree to which dividend reductions signal managerial
information about future bank earnings, and induce externalities. The results show that dividend
reductions by regional banks generate significantly positive, competitive effects for rival banks
in the same geographic area. These effects occur in response to dividend reductions at regional
banks that have bank-specific rather than generalized causes. Regulatory enforcement actions
generate positive competitive effects on banks in the same geographic area, paralleling those for
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dividend reductions, which suggest that there is imperfect competition in local banking markets.
On the other hand, dividend reductions at money center banks generate negative externalities for
regional banks. The contagion effects suggest that rival banks interpret these announcements as
altered expectations about bank cash flows, rather than the aggressiveness of regulators.

4.3. Hypotheses
The informational externalities effects found for industrial IPOs might not be generalized
for bank IPOs. The difference in information structure and presence of regulations may lead rival
banks to react differently when a bank announces an initial public offering.
To test the theoretical predictions of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Gorton (1985), I
hypothesize that:

H 8:

Rival banks experience wealth effects around bank IPOs announcements.

Rivals' valuation effects may be positive or negative, depending on how investors use the
information disclosed at the announcement date to reassess the value of non-announcing banks.
However, the positive and negative valuation effects are not mutually exclusive. If going public
decisions reveal favorable information about future industry prospects, rivals will experience
wealth gains at the announcement date. However, as a result of thrift institutions' conversion to
stock charter banks, the competition for market share has been increased, newly formed banks
having the same operations as commercial banks. Therefore, rivals may lose some of their
market share when a new bank competes more effectively with the funds raised in an IPO. To
test this hypothesis, I examine the rival portfolios abnormal returns around IPO announcements
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for the entire sample period and for subsamples based on rivals' classification: state rivals and
regional rivals.
Local market concentration plays an important role in the intra-information transfer
around public announcements. Akhigbe and Madura (1999) show that in-market acquisitions (in
which the acquiring and the target bank are headquartered in the same state) create the potential
for anticompetitive problems by increasing the probability of collusion among rival banks within
the state. Their results show, however, that rival banks do not experience significant abnormal
returns, rejecting the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the degree of
concentration and rivals' valuation effects.
Depending on the local concentration level, rival banks may react differently when a
bank goes public. Rivals headquartered in states (regions) with higher concentration level (low
competition) are not likely to adversely be affected by a new entrant. However, those located in
lower concentrated states (regions) may experience competitive shifts in their market share. To
test whether the degree of concentration level influences the rivals reaction in response to bank
IPO announcements, I hypothesize that:

H9:

The higher the local market concentration level, the lower the valuation effects
for rivals in response to bank IPO announcements.

The concentration variable is proxied by the Herfindahl Index. The index is computed as
the sum of squared market share of each rival relative to all rivals in the same state/region.
Market share is defined as the rival's total assets at the end of fiscal year prior to the IPO
announcement divided by total assets of all rivals in the same state/region.
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4.4. Data and Methodology
4.4.1. Sample Selection
In this chapter I examine the rivals' share price reactions in response to bank IPO
announcements during 1983-2001 period. To measure the abnormal return of rival banks in
response to each IPO announcement, a list of IPO announcements was compiled from Thompson
Financial Security Database (SDC-Global Issue Database). SDC database contains 502 bank
IPOs (SIC 602 and 603) for 1983-2001 period. To be included in the final sample, the IPO banks
have to meet the following criteria: 1) offer price of $5 or higher; 2) proceeds data available in
SDC; 3) financial data available in the first year of listing (total assets, revenues, shares
outstanding); 4) at least one rival bank headquartered in the same state/region with available
price information. The final sample of bank IPOs consists of 312 IPOs.
For each of the 312 bank IPO announcements, I establish bank rivals within the same
state (for 1983-1996 period) or region (for 1997-2001 period)2, that satisfy the following criteria:
1) each rival bank is listed on AMEX, NYSE or Nasdaq CRSP files; 2) rival banks do not
experience confounding events during a 30 day period centered at the announcement day; 3) they
have financial data (total assets, revenues, shares outstanding) available on Compustat.
The final sample of rival banks corresponding to the 312 IPO announcements consists of 6,316
rivals that represent forty-nine states and five regions. Regional location is classified according
to banking regions identified by the "American Banker" which closely follows Federal Reserve
Districts. There are 5 regions with the following corresponding states: a) Mid-Atlantic region:

2

According to The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, any bank holding
company was allowed to acquire a bank anywhere in the U.S. Also, "interstate branching", allowed bank holding
companies to merge operations across state lines, turning out-of-state banks into interstate branches of the main
bank. For a detailed discussion of the regulation/deregulation in the banking industry that has a direct impact on the
analysis, see Appendix A.
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DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA; b) Southeast region: AL, AR, FL, GA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV;
c) Midwest region: IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI; d) Southwest
region: CO, LA, NM, OK, TX, UT; e) West region: AK, AZ, CA, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, WA,
WY.3

4.4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 12 presents the frequency of bank IPOs and their corresponding rivals across years.
Seventy-three percent of total IPO announcements occur during 1983-1988 period. This is not
surprising as numerous thrift institutions converted to stock charter banks after 1982. As a
comparison, Houge and Loughran's (1999) sample is very similar with respect to IPOs
distribution across sample period. Out of 393 IPOs during 1983-1991, they report 95% occurring
during 1983-1988, which is similar to 94.5% of IPOs undertaken over the same sample period.
Table 13 reports mean and median values of selected variables for both bank IPO firms
and their rivals. Both mean and median differences between the two subsamples are statistically
significant at 5% level. The median total assets of bank IPO firms is $1,071 million, whereas
rivals' median total assets is almost double ($1,943 million). Rivals' median revenues is almost
three times as that of bank IPO firms ($178 million versus $67 million). Finally, the median
market value of rivals ($197 million) is more than five times bigger than the median market
value of equity of bank IPO firms ($38 million). I conclude that the sample of bank IPOs is
comprised of small, community-based institutions. Even though the sample includes some
regional institutions, it contains no large, money center banks. The exact composition of rival
portfolios varies with the timing of the event. The average number of rivals per IPO event for the

3

The distribution of rival banks by states and regions is presented in Appendix B.
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1983-1996 period is 39, the median is 11, the minimum is 1 and the maximum is 74. For the
1997-2000 sample period, the average number of rivals per IPO event is 91, the median is 20, the
minimum is 8 and the maximum is 116.

Table 12
Frequency of bank IPOs and their rivals across years
The sample consists of bank IPOs during the 1983-20004 period that satisfy the following
criteria: a) there is at least one rival bank free of any confounding event within the same SIC
codes 602 and 603; b) the offer price is at least $5; c) financial data is available in Compustat
(both active and research). Rival banks are defined as publicly traded banks within the same state
(1983-1996 period) or within the same region (1997-2000).
Year
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Total

4

Number of
Bank IPOs
33
25
27
76
40
26
5
3
5
4
14
5
3
10
7
22
4
3
312

No IPO announcement in 2001 met the criteria imposed.

Number of
rivals
153
264
153
782
285
167
66
25
115
71
836
306
224
680
366
1,359
264
200
6,316
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Table 13
Descriptive statistics for bank IPO firms and their rivals
This table reports mean and median values for chosen variables, and the difference in mean/median
between bank IPO firms and their rivals with respect to each variable. The sample of bank IPO
firms consist of all banks that went public during 1983-2000 period. To enter in the sample they
have to satisfy the following criteria: a) there is at least one rival bank free of any confounding
event within the same SIC codes 602 and 603; b) the offer price is at least $5; c) financial data is
available in Compustat (both active and research). Rival banks are defined as publicly traded banks
within the same state (1983-1996 period) or within the same region (1997-2000). To enter in the
sample they have to have return data on CRSP around IPO event, financial data on Compustat (both
active and research). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Bank IPO firms
Variable (in mil.)
1. IPO Proceeds
2. Total Assets
3. Revenues
4. Market Value of
Equity

Mean

Bank rivals

Difference

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

19.85

13.80

--

--

--

1,530.56

1,071.31

8,906.79

1,943.19

-7,376.23**

135.47

66.66

824.26

178.01

-688.79**

-871.876**
111.354**

-1,179.16**

158.613**

65.10

38.30

1,244.26

196.91

4.4.3 Methodology
To capture the valuation effects of rivals in response to bank IPO announcements, I use
event study methodology to measure the rivals' share price reaction. Day 0 is the registration date
on the Registered Offerings of Securities tape of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Daily share prices for rivals' sample are from the Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP). To measure abnormal returns, I employ the market-adjusted model (Brown and Warner,
1985). To obtain the abnormal return of rival bank portfolio, all publicly traded banks that were
headquartered in the same state/region as the announcing bank are pooled into an equally-
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weighted portfolio. The procedure of creating an equally weighted-portfolio accounts for
potential cross-sectional correlation of returns in the industry. The abnormal return of each rival
bank portfolio p and for each date t in the event period (-2, 2) is computed as:
A p ,t = R p ,t − Rm ,t , where Rm ,t is the return on the CRSP value weighted index for day t.
To test whether there is a significant difference in mean (median) cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) between two subsamples, I use t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively.
The next step is to analyze the cross-sectional variation in intra-industry information
effects of bank IPO announcements. Previous studies show that industry characteristics, rivalspecific characteristics and event-specific characteristics can explain the variations in intraindustry information effects. Based on theoretical predictions of going public decision, I estimate
the following model:

RivalCARi = α 0 + α1CONCMKTi + α 2 RivalSIZEi + α 3 RivalPERFORM i +
+ α 41983 − 1996i + SIC 603i + 1983 − 1988i + α 5 IPO _ SIZEi + ε i

The dependent variable is the five-day CAR of each rival bank in response to the announced
initial public offering of bank firm i. CONCMKTi is the pre-IPO concentration level in the state
or region. I use Herfindahl Index (HI) to measure the concentration level. The Herfindahl Index
is computed as the squared sum of fractions of total assets of all rival banks in the state/region in
which the announcing bank is headquartered. The concentration variable is obtained by
multiplying the HI by a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if HI>median and zero
otherwise. RivalSIZEi is proxied by ln (market value of equity). RivalPERFORM i is the prior
price performance of rival banks. Each rival bank's performance is measured as the difference
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between the rival's actual stock return and the CRSP equally weighted index averaged over a 12month period prior to the announced IPO of bank i. A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the
IPO announcement occurs during the 1983-1996 period and zero otherwise is used to check
whether rival banks react differently if the regulatory environment is different. Two other
dummy variables are used to isolate the rivals' reaction to thrift institutions (SIC 603) and to IPO
announcements during the 1983-1988 period (72.8% of the sample). IPO _ SIZEi is proxied by
ln (total proceeds raised at the time of IPO).

4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1. Rival banks' valuation effects in response to IPO announcements
I use five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for equally-weighted portfolios as a
measure of information transferred from bank IPO firms to non-bank firms within the same
state/region. Table 14 presents both mean and median rivals' CARs for the entire sample of IPOs
and for subsamples: 1983-1996 and 1997-2000. When considering all bank IPO announcements,
the mean cumulative abnormal return is 0.52% for state rivals (significant at 1% level) and
0.29% for regional rivals (significant at 5% level). However, the median CAR is significantly
different from zero only for state rivals (0.17%). These results support the hypothesis that bank
IPO announcements have externalities effects on other banks, consistent with the theoretical
predictions of Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and Gorton (1985). The positive reaction for
rivals is interpreted as going public decisions signal positive prospects for the entire industry and
investors in rival banks incorporate the information disclosed at the filing date to reassess the
value of publicly traded banks.
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To account for differences in regulations during the sample period, I compute the
cumulative abnormal returns for state rivals (1983-1996) and regional rivals (1997-2000)
separately. Both mean and median CARs are positive and statistically different from zero (0.56%

Table 14
Valuation effects for rival banks in response to IPOs announcements
This table presents the cumulative 5-day abnormal return for rival bank portfolios in response to
312 bank IPO announcements. Rival portfolios contain all rival banks in the same state/region
that were publicly traded at that time, grouped into an equally weighted portfolio by event.
Abnormal returns are computed using market-adjusted model.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Regional rivals*

State rivals

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

0.29**

0.12

0.52***

0.17***

--

--

0.56**

0.35***

Rivals' reactions by region:
1997-2000

0.44**

-0.01

•

Mid-Atlantic regional banks

1.98***

1.75***

•

Midwest regional banks

-0.01

•

Southeast regional banks

0.44***

0.01

•

Southwest regional banks

1.52***

0.88***

•

West regional banks

0.23

0.11

All banks' reaction: 1983-2000
Rivals' reactions by state:
1983-1996

-0.50**

* Regional locations are classified according to the American Banker which closely follow the Federal Reserve
System districts. The Mid-Atlantic region includes banks in DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, and PA. The Southeast region
includes banks in: AL, AR, FL, GA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV. The Midwest region includes banks in: IA, IL, IN,
KS, KY, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI. The Southwest region includes banks in: CO, LA, NM, OK, TX, and
UT. The West region includes banks in: AK, AZ, CA, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, WA, WY. The New England region
includes banks in: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI (no bank IPO during the 1997-2000 period for this region met the criteria
selection imposed).
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and 0.35% respectively) for state rivals' sample and have higher magnitude than those for the
entire sample, which suggests that state rivals interpret the going public decisions favorably as
they reveal good prospects for the entire industry. Regional rivals, however, have insignificant
reaction at the IPO announcement day (-0.01%) which makes the interpretation difficult. Either
offsetting effects (some rivals react positively, some negatively) occur or the IPO
announcements do not reveal information that has industry-wide implications. To further
examine whether IPO announcements are informative for regional rivals, I compute the
cumulative abnormal returns for each region. Positive and significant reactions are present in two
regions: Mid-Atlantic (1.75%) and Southwest region (0.88%), while negative and significant
reaction is present in the Midwest region (-0.50%). These opposing effects may explain the
overall insignificant reaction for the regional rivals' sample, but they show that depending on the
regional location of the announcing bank, IPO events convey information that has regional-wide
implications. Regional differences in information transfer can be viewed as a byproduct of
regional variation in economic conditions, real estate markets, lending practices, the makeup of
loan portfolios, etc. Thus, it is important noting the extent to which regional considerations
influence the stock price reactions of non-announcing banks. While the overall sample of
regional rivals seems to indicate no reaction in response to IPO announcements, notable
exceptions and regional influences are present.

4.5.2. The impact of local concentration on rivals' valuation effects
Akhigbe and Madura (1999) show that local market concentration influences the
direction of rivals' reaction around bank acquisition announcements. Depending on the local
concentration level, rival banks may react differently when a bank goes public. Rivals
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headquartered in states (regions) with higher concentration level (low competition) are not likely
to adversely be affected by a new entrant. However, those located in lower concentrated states
(regions) may experience competitive shifts in their market share. Table 15 presents the results

Table 15
Bank Rivals' reaction classified by level of concentration
This table presents the mean and median 5-day cumulative abnormal return of rival bank
portfolios classified by the level of concentration. Herfindahl Index (HI) measures the level
of concentration for each state/region. It is defined as the sum of square market share of
each bank within any given state/region. The market share is defined as the rival bank's
total assets at year-end prior to IPO announcement relative to state or region's total assets.
Rival banks are grouped into two subsamples, based on whether they belong to highly
concentrated states/regions or low states/regions. Abnormal returns are computed using
market-adjusted model. Panel A shows the rivals' reaction in response to a bank IPO in the
same state, whereas Panel B shows the rival banks' reaction to a bank IPO in the same
region.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A
Rival banks' reaction in response to a bank IPO in the same state, classified by level of
concentration

IPOs: 1983-1996

Mean

Median

Below median HI

0.46

0.14

Above median HI

0.65**

0.48***

Panel B
Rival banks' reaction in response to a bank IPO in the same region, classified by level of
concentration
Mean
IPOs: 1997-2000

Median

Below median HI

0.11

-0.32

Above median HI

0.77***

0.29***
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based on whether rival banks belong to a highly concentrated state/region (above median
Herfindahl Index) or low concentrated state/region (below median Herfindahl Index). Panel A
shows the median cumulative abnormal returns of state rivals equally weighted portfolios in
response to IPO announcements during 1983-1996 period. Surprisingly, rivals in low
concentrated states (high competition for market share) experience no significant reaction when
banks go public. This could be interpreted as if the information disclosed at the IPO
announcement date does not reveal comparative advantages to their rivals. Panel B presents the
mean and median cumulative abnormal returns for regional rivals in response to bank IPO
announcements during the 1997-2000 period. As in the case of state rivals, the reaction is
insignificant for those headquartered in low concentrated regions. Even though the median CAR
is negative, it is not significant which suggests that going public decisions do not generate
competitive effects for bank rivals. Regional rivals in highly concentrated markets, however,
experience wealth gains at the IPO announcements date. These findings do not support the
hypothesis that the higher the level of market concentration, the lower the rivals' reaction. A
possible explanation could be as follow: the going public decision can be viewed as a way to
create public shares to facilitate a future acquisition. Rival banks will be likely to target newly
formed banks in order to expand their activities within the region and, therefore to increase their
clientele portfolios in an efficient way. From this perspective, bank IPO announcements are good
news and they translate in wealth gains for rivals.

4.5.3. Cross-sectional variation in rivals' reaction in response to bank IPO announcements
Previous studies show that individual rival's reaction can be explained by both event
specific characteristics and rivals' characteristics. To examine the impact of those characteristics

81

on the degree of information transferred from announcing banks to rivals, I use the individual
rival bank's cumulative abnormal returns as dependent variable. The independent variables are
the rival size, prior rival performance, degree of local market concentration, and IPO size.
Rival bank size: From Atiase's (1985) work, a general argument can be made that the
information-signaling effects are inversely related to the size of the rival. If relatively larger
banks are more scrutinized by market participants, then the incremental information would not
be conveyed to the relatively large rival banks at the time of the announcement. Thus, the intraindustry effects should be greater for small rival banks. The natural logarithm of the market
value of rival banks is used as a proxy for the size of rival bank.
Prior rival performance: If bank rivals with lower price performance have more potential
to enhance their own performance in response to more favorable industry prospects, then they
should experience a more favorable share price response than other rivals with superior
performance. I use the median stock price performance of rival banks as a proxy for
performance. The stock price performance is measured as the difference between a firm's actual
stock return and the CRSP equally weighted market return averaged over a 12-month period
prior to the corresponding bank IPO announcement.
IPO size: The amount of IPO proceeds can influence the magnitude of rivals' reaction.
Banks that raise a higher amount of proceeds are expected to convey more information to rivals
and, therefore, a positive relationship between the IPO size and rival's reaction is expected. The
IPO size is proxied by the natural logarithm of proceeds.
Local market concentration: To account for the impact of local market concentration on
individual rival's reaction, I use a dummy variable that takes value of one if the rival bank
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belongs to a highly concentrated state/region and zero otherwise. Rivals' reaction is expected to
be lower if they are headquartered in highly concentrated markets.
The regression analysis results are presented in Table 16. The coefficient of rival size is
positive but marginally significant. This suggests that intra-industry effects are higher for larger
rival banks. Coupled with the positive and significant coefficient for concentration dummy, it
can be concluded that IPO announcements are informative for large rivals in highly concentrated
markets. The coefficient for prior rival performance is negative and significant which suggests

Table 16
Explaining the cross-sectional variation in individual bank rivals' reaction
This table reports the individual bank rival's valuation effects in response to an IPO
announcement in the same state/region. The dependent variable is the 5-day cumulative
abnormal returns. Rival size is proxied by ln(Market Value of Equity). Rival bank prior
performance is the difference between bank's actual stock return and CRSP equally weighted
market return over a 12-month period prior to IPO announcements. Herfindahl index is defined
as the sum of square market share of each bank within any given state/region. The market share
is defined as the rival bank's total assets at year-end prior to IPO announcement relative to state
or region's total assets. "Year" is a dummy variable that takes on values on 1 if the IPO event
occurs during the 1983-1996 period and zero otherwise. SIC 603 dummy takes the value of one
if a thrift institution goes public and zero otherwise. IPO size is proxied by ln(Proceeds).
Dependent variable: Rival bank CAR (-2,2)

Constant
Rival size
Rival performance
HI dummy
1983-1996 dummy
IPO size
SIC 603 dummy
1983-1988 dummy
R2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.440*
0.164*
-0.253***
0.241**
0.030
0.010***

0.421*
0.161*
-0.244***
0.240**
0.025
0.009***
0.004

0.420*
0.161*
-0.242***
0.245**
0.020
0.009***

0.395*
0.160*
-0.233***
0.230**
0.018
0.009***
0.004
0.040**
0.108

0.100

0.103

0.050**
0.107

83

that rivals with higher prior performance experience lower reaction in response to IPO
announcements. This supports the argument that the intra-industry effect is stronger in periods in
which rival bank stock returns are relatively low. Thus, rivals with lower price performance have
more potential to enhance their own performance in response to more favorable industry
prospects. The coefficient of IPO size is positive and significant at 1% level which provides
support for the hypothesis that the higher the IPO proceeds, the more information is conveyed to
the market and as a result, rivals will have a higher reaction. To account for potential differences
in rivals' reaction between the two subperiods with different regulations, I use a dummy variable
that takes value of one if the IPOs had occurred during 1983-1996 period and zero otherwise.
The coefficient for this variable is insignificant which suggests that rivals do not experience
significant different reactions based on rivals' classification. Finally, the coefficient for SIC 603
dummy is positive but not statistically significant. This implies that rival banks do not have a
significant reaction when a thrift institution goes public relative to that when a commercial bank
goes public. However, the coefficient for 1983-1988 dummy is positive and significant, which
suggests that rival banks experience a higher reaction in a period of high IPO activity in the
banking industry. This suggests that the higher the IPO activity, the larger the amount of
information conveyed to the industry, the higher the rivals' reaction. The results of the regression
analysis are similar when the last two dummy variables are not included.

4.6. Summary and conclusions
The evidence provided in this chapter is consistent with theoretical predictions of
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Gorton (1985) who predict that bank announcements
have the potential for externalities effects on other banks. Bank IPOs can signal valuable
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information about the future prospects for the banking industry. Since the value of a bank is
partially dependent on the prospects for the entire industry, rival banks can experience valuation
effects in response to an IPO announcement. The analysis of bank IPO announcements over the
1983-2000 period confirms favorable externalities effects on rival banks, as both state and
regional rivals have positive and significant reactions for the overall sample of IPO
announcements. However, regional differences in reactions are noted. Positive and significant
reactions are present in two regions: Mid-Atlantic and Southwest region, while negative and
significant reaction is present in Midwest region. These opposing effects may explain the overall
insignificant reaction for the regional rivals' sample in response to IPO announcements during
the 1997-2000 period, but they show that depending on the regional location of the announcing
bank, IPO events convey information that has regional-wide implications. Thus, it is important
noting the extent to which regional considerations influence the stock price reactions of nonannouncing banks.
The variation in individual rival's reaction is explained both by rivals' characteristics and
event-specific characteristics. Relatively larger rivals and those in highly concentrated markets
experience a higher reaction than small size rivals and those that operate in low concentrated
markets. The absence of competitive effects in low concentrated markets (high competition) can
be explained by the fact that the IPO sample consists of small, community-based institutions that
represent no threat for rival banks. The valuation effects are inversely related to prior rival's
performance. Poor performing rival banks have more potential to enhance their own performance
in response to more favorable industry prospects. Finally, an important factor that explains the
variation in rivals' reaction is the IPO size. The evidence suggests that the higher the amount of
IPO proceeds, the more information is conveyed to bank rivals.
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Overall, the analysis suggests that bank IPO announcements transmit a signal about bank
rivals, and the strength of the signal is not only influenced by event-specific characteristics, but
also by rival bank specific-characteristics.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS

In this dissertation I examine whether initial public offering announcements have
externalities effects on similar publicly traded firms in industrial and banking sector. The
evidence indicate that going public decisions generate positive externalities effects for both
industrial and bank rivals. However, notable differences exist between the two sectors.
The evidence shows that industrial rivals experience positive and significant reaction in
response to venture backed IPOs and no reaction in response to non-venture backed IPOs. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that venture backed IPOs signal superior information about
industry prospects and the information revealed has industry-wide implications. Rivals'
characteristics play an important role in information transfer around IPO announcements. High
market-to-book rivals have positive and significant valuation effects in response to venture
backed IPOs whereas low market-to-book rivals have negative and significant valuation effects
in response to non-venture backed IPO announcements. This implies that high market-to-book
rivals have the ability to incorporate future growth opportunities available within an industry
when this information is signaled at the filing date. On the other hand, low market-to-book rivals
that operate in low concentrated industries may experience competitive disadvantages when a
non-venture backed IPO firm enters in the market. With respect to size, small size rival
portfolios show a higher reaction than that of large size rival portfolios. It suggests that small
size rivals have the potential to gain more from the information revealed by a venture backed
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IPO. Rivals in low concentrated industries that have low market-to-book ratio and are smaller in
size experience negative reactions at the IPO announcements, regardless whether the IPOs are
venture backed or not. However, the negative reaction has a higher magnitude in response to a
non-venture backed IPO announcement. It can be concluded that both event and rivals'
characteristics taken simultaneously can explain the variation in the information transfer.
One important factor that influences the direction and magnitude of rivals' valuation
effects is the relative size of IPO firm. The evidence suggests that the larger the size of IPO firm
relative to industry counterparts, the greater the impact on rivals. Rivals experience more
positive wealth effects when a relatively larger firm goes public.
When a venture-backed IPO undergoes downward price revision at the offering date, it
entails negative valuation consequence for rivals. However, the opposite does not hold when
upward price revisions occur. It might be the case that they already incorporated the positive
information generated by going public decisions at the filing date.
Bank IPOs generate higher externalities than industrial IPOs. Regardless of bank rivals'
location (same state/region), they experience positive abnormal returns in response to an
announcing IPO in the same state/region. This is consistent with Kohers (1999) who shows that
the presence of regulation creates less diversity across banking firms and therefore, investors
have higher propensity to react in response to public bank announcements. Within regional bank
reaction, two regions experience a higher externality effect: Mid-Atlantic region and Southwest
region. I interpret this result as rival banks having a higher opportunity to expand by acquiring a
newly publicly traded bank in their region. This is consistent with the inter-state acquisition and
consolidation activity after 1997 as a result of branching deregulation Act of 1994.
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In chapter 4, the evidence shows that bank rivals have positive and significant reaction if
they belong to highly concentrated states/regions. Coupled with the lack of competitive effects
for low concentrated states/regions, one possible extension for the banking sector would be to
further examine the externalities effects of IPO banking firms that are subsequently acquired by
rival banks versus those that are not subsequently acquired. It might be the case that rival banks
in highly concentrated markets react positively only when they view the newly formed bank as a
potential target.
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APPENDIX A: Regulatory environment

Two important regulations have a direct impact on the analysis of bank initial public
offerings' externalities on other banks: a) The Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982; and b) The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.

a) The Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
According to this Act, thrift institutions are allowed to convert from mutual associations
to stock charter institutions. Under this regulation, the conversion must involve a public sale of
stock to depositors and management with an underwritten agreement. Conversion leads to major
changes in voting rights, property rights and capital structure. Also, the regulation stipulates that
a converting institution must sell all of its capital stock at market value, based on an independent
valuation. The sale must be made by subscription through stock rights issued to eligible
accountholders, with any unsubscribed stock sold through a public offering. The rights offering
has two unusual features: first, non-transferable rights to purchase stock in newly formed
institutions are distributed to depositors and management under a complicated priority system.
Second, the offering price is unknown over the subscription period; only a price range of 15%
around the independent appraiser's estimate of the net worth is specified. This is similar to
bookbuilding phase for traditional IPOs, but the conversion process typically lasts for more than
a year, whereas an average of two months is the normal process of bookbuilding.
As a result of the conversion process, the market value of the converting institution will
most likely be altered due to: 1) equity capital inflow; 2) increasing the present value of thrift
institution's cash flows from existing assets and current and future operations; 3) decreasing the
market value of deposit insurance coverage; and 4) creating current and future conversion related
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expenses. However, the most significant valuation effect of conversion is the increase in the net
worth due to the sale of equity. This capital inflow alleviates the problem associated with equity
capital shortages, enhancing potential growth and making the newly formed bank to compete
more effectively with commercial banks. Theoretically, conversions are supposed to be a
positive function of both potential growth and intensity of competition within each state. Masulis
(1987) empirically examines this theoretical prediction and finds all the significant parameter
estimates (i.e. percentage change in state-wide deposits of depository institutions, percentage
change in state-wide depository institutions offices, percentage change in dollar value of S&L
mortgage originations in the state, etc) consistent with the predictions of positive relationships
between the likelihood of conversion and growth in demand and intensity of competition.

b) The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
Prior to the Riegle-Neal Act, the U.S. banking industry has followed a dual federal and
state approach. In an effort to create parity among different institutions (branching) and provide
new opportunities, federal regulators have passed different legislation, yet interstate branching
were restricted to protect local markets.
The Riegle-Neal Act is a multi-component event. One component refers to "interstate
banking" which allowed any bank holding company to acquire a bank anywhere in the U.S. The
second component, "interstate branching", allowed bank holding companies to merge operations
across state lines, turning out-of-state banks into interstate branches of the main bank. The
Riegle-Neal Act allowed immediate intrastate branching and acquisitions across state lines one
year later (1995) and consolidation of banks (in 1997) with the ability to opt in or out.
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1) Interstate acquisitions: Any bank holding company was allowed to acquire a bank
anywhere in the U.S. in September 1995. In acquiring out-of-state banks, bidders
were allowed to take deposits and process transactions across state borders. This
component of legislation overcomes the restrictive covenants in some states that
allowed interstate banking only on a regional basis (the 30-miles rule). Several
restrictions were imposed, for example acquisitions could be blocked if concentration
ratios were greater than 10% (30%) of U.S. (state) deposits. Also, acquisitions were
subject to reinvestment laws, in the sense that banks were required to lend at least
50% of the average for that state, otherwise it could face intervention.
2) Interstate branching: As of 1997, banks could merge operations across state lines,
turning out-of-state banks into interstate branches of the main bank. Even though
some states opted in early (1996), as of the end of 1997 all states had to decide to opt
in or out, otherwise interstate branching in that state would be based on federal
provisions.
As a result of regulations/deregulation in the U.S. banking industry over the last two
decades, and the impact they have on individual bank valuation in response to public
announcements, caution needs to be exercised when determining the bank rivals. As emerged
from the discussion of the two most important Acts, banks can be considered rivals as following:
for 1982-1996 period, any bank that operates within the same state as announcing bank; for
1997-2001 period, any bank that operates in the same region as announcing bank.
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APPENDIX B: Distribution of rival banks
a) Distribution of rival banks by state (1983-1996 period)
State

No. of Rivals

AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
Subtotal
Total

124
44
6
280
22
158
20
13
267
155
9
48
4
245
148
25
87
36
217
67
5
184
75
145
72
2,456

Percent of
Total
3.0
1.1
0.1
6.8
0.5
3.8
0.5
0.3
6.5
3.8
0.2
1.2
0.1
5.9
3.6
0.6
2.1
0.9
5.3
1.6
0.1
4.5
1.8
3.5
1.7

State

No. of Rivals

MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

5
206
9
27
15
125
6
2
229
228
17
5
171
5
68
108
53
15
186
10
23
99
54
5

Subtotal

Percent of
Total
0.10
5.00
0.20
0.70
0.40
3.00
0.10
0.00
5.50
5.50
0.40
0.10
4.10
0.10
1.60
2.60
1.30
0.40
4.50
0.20
0.60
2.40
1.30
0.10

1,671

4,127

b) Distribution of rival banks by region (1997-2000 period)
Region
Mid-Atlantic
Midwest
Southeast
Southwest
West
Total

No. of Rivals
132
697
878
165
317
2,189

Percent of Total
6.0
31.8
40.1
7.5
14.5
100.0
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